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 In 2002, the Supreme Court found school-voucher programs1 that include 
religious schools constitutional.2  Once such a program is in place,3 it is unsettled 
whether state and local governments can place restrictions on the activities of 
religious schools as a condition on their participation.4  For example, the Court has 
not addressed whether state and local governments can require that the hiring 
                                                 
1 While the term “school choice” encompasses many different arrangements, some including private 
schools and religious schools, the phrase “school-voucher programs” is narrower.  For example, intra-
district public school choice allows students to attend other public schools within the school district, 
but not private schools.  Vermont’s and Maine’s school choice programs provide students living in 
towns without public schools vouchers to attend private, but not religious, schools.  Lastly, some 
authors include public charter schools and magnet schools under the “school choice” umbrella.  To 
avoid this confusion of definitions, this Article refers to programs that provide tuition assistance for 
children to attend private, including religious, schools as “school voucher programs.”  Some school-
voucher program proponents, however, dislike the term “voucher.”  “Voucher has become such a 
dirty word. Voucher is just a way of paying for something. We are talking about having families 
reassume the rights that have been taken away from them. It's not about vouchers. It's about freedom.” 
Michael Lynch, Higher Learning, REASON MAGAZINE, June 2001, at 22 (quoting Ted Forstmann 
who, along with Sam Walton, formed the Children’s Scholarship Fund which raised $200 million for 
private school scholarships for low-income children).  See also Amy Gutmann, Assessing Arguments 
for School Choice: Pluralism, Parental Rights, or Educational Results?, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE 
MORAL DEBATE 127 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003). 
 
2 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).  For an enjoyable history of the legal battles 
leading up to Zelman, see CLINT BOLICK, VOUCHER WARS: WAGING THE LEGAL BATTLE OVER 
SCHOOL CHOICE (2003). 
 
3 This Article does not address whether excluding religious schools from participating in a voucher 
program would violate the Free Exercise Clause.  For more information, see Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a Washington program that prohibited higher-education tuition vouchers 
for religious instruction); Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944, 952 (Me. 2006) (upholding 
Maine’s school-voucher program that excludes religious schools); Thomas [C.] Berg, Vouchers and 
Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (2003) (pre-Locke and 
Anderson analysis); Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Funding of Religious Institutions in 
Light of Locke v. Davey: The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the Future of State Payments for 
Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L. REV.  227 (2004); Matthew Gaus, Note, 
Locke v. Davey: Discretion, Discrimination, and the New Free Exercise, 54 KAN. L. REV. 553 (2006); 
Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking It Out of Neutral: The Application of Locke’s Substantial Interest Test 
to the School Voucher Debate, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1275-1281 (2005). 
 
4 See, e.g., Gia Fonte, Note, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School Vouchers, Education’s 
Winning Lottery Ticket, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 562 (2003).  “The Court … left one important 
question unanswered: What regulatory strings may the government attach to religious schools 
participating in voucher programs without violating the Constitution?”  Id. 
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practices of religious schools conform to local antidiscrimination laws.5  This open 
question has implications for the ultimate success of voucher programs. 
 Currently, voucher programs allowing students to attend religiously affiliated 
schools exist in Arizona,6 Florida, 7 Georgia,8 Ohio,9 Utah,10 Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin,11 and the District of Columbia.12  Typically, low-income students 
attending underperforming public schools can qualify to participate in a voucher 
                                                 
5 “The courts have not fully addressed the validity of [religious schools’ Title VII] exemption [for 
religious discrimination] where government-funded programs or positions are involved.”  David 
Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1393 (2003).  See also Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt 
from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007); Nadine Strossen, Religion and the Constitution: 
A Libertarian Perspective, 2005-06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 43 (2005/2006) (noting that “requiring 
religious institutions to adhere to [regulatory conditions], as a condition of funding, endangers the 
institutions’ religious liberty”). 
 
6 Arizona has two school-voucher programs: one for special-needs children and one for foster-care 
children.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-891 – 891.06 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-817 – 817.07 (2007). 
 
7 Florida’s Opportunity Scholarship Program, which provided vouchers for all students in poorly 
performing public schools, was declared unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution based on a 
constitutional provision requiring uniformity among publicly funded schools.  Bush v. Holmes, 919 
So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).  A similar program limited to special-needs students remains unchallenged.  
FLA. STAT. § 1002.39 (2007). 
 
8 Georgia’s program is limited to special-needs students.  GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2110 – 2118 (2007). 
 
9 Originally available only in Cleveland schools, the Ohio legislature adopted the program statewide 
in 2005.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3310.01 – 3310.41 (2008) (statewide program); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 3313.974 – 3313.976 (2008) (Cleveland program). 
 
10 Utah’s voucher program is limited to special-needs students.  UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-1A-701 – 
710 (2007).  The implementation of a universal program was blocked by referendum in November 
2007.  See Dan Lips, School Choice: Policy Developments and National Participation Estimates in 
2007-2008, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2102, Jan. 31, 2008, p. 6. 
 
11 The first school voucher program in the United States began in 1990.  WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (2006). 
 
12 Rather than a local statute, the District of Columbia’s voucher program resulted from an Act of 
Congress, the FY2004 District of Columbia Appropriations Bill.  For the 2007-08 school year, over 
1900 students were enrolled in the voucher program.  Press release, D.C. School Choice Program 
Again Sets Record for Enrolled K-12 Students, Washington Scholarship Fund, Sept. 26, 2007, 





program.13  These students receive tuition vouchers to defray or eliminate the cost of 
attending another school with a higher student-performance record.14  While secular 
private schools can participate, sectarian schools would likely be the schools of 
choice for participants because of the sheer predominance of religious schools.15 
 Proponents of school-voucher programs cite many theories about the need for 
these programs to provide alternatives to failing public schools.16  In addition to 
improving the public schools through competition for students17 and making schools 
                                                 
13 The Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and Utah programs are limited to particular student populations, 
such as special-needs students or children in foster care.  The Cleveland program allows low-income 
students in failing public school districts to use vouchers to pay tuition at private, including religious, 
schools or to attend participating public schools.  The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the oldest 
voucher program in the country, and the District of Columbia program allow all children from low-
income families to attend private religious and non-religious schools.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 
(West 1999). Participating schools must accept all income-eligible students.  Id.  The Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program, the program considered by the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, awards scholarships to Cleveland students, with preference for low-income students, to attend 
private (religious and non-religious) schools or public schools in adjacent districts.  OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (Anderson 1999).  At this time, no adjacent public schools participate in 
the program.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002).  
 
14 See WISC. STAT. ANN. §119.23 (West 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§3313.974-3313.979 
(Anderson 1999). 
 
15 See, e.g., 1 THOMAS JAMES & HENRY M. LEVIN, COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS: 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 34 (1988).  According to the Institute for the Transformation of 
Learning at Marquette University, approximately 67% of parents participating in the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program chose to send their children to religious schools between 1998 and 2001.  Id.  
In Cleveland’s school voucher programs, 96% of students attend religiously affiliated schools.  
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002). 
 
16 See Amy Guttman, Assessing Arguments for School Choice: Pluralism, Parental Rights, or 
Educational Results, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 126 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003); Terry M. 
Moe, Going Private, in CHARTERS, VOUCHERS, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 102, 102-04 (Paul E. 
Peterson & David E. Campbell eds., 2001); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to 
Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.  791, 805-808 (2005).  
 
17 Caroline Hoxby, Rising Tide, EDUCATION NEXT, Winter 2001, at 69 (showing that in the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, public “schools [that] fac[ed] the most potential competition 
from vouchers” had the best productivity response).  See also Frederick M. Hess, et. al., Responding 
to Competition, in CHARTERS, VOUCHERS, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 215 (Paul E. Peterson & David E. 
Campbell eds., 2001). 
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more accountable to parents,18 many advocates believe that school-voucher programs 
will provide parents with the opportunity to tailor their children’s education.19  
Schools that succeed at teaching students20 will continue in the program, while those 
that do not will rightfully be removed.  The right formula of discipline, class-size, 
after-school tutoring, and teaching curricula will depend on each individual school 
and class.  School-voucher programs allow parents to choose the school with the 
combination of factors that best suits their child.21  By allowing low-income students 
the opportunity to attend a school tailored to their needs, school-voucher programs 
will allow the experimentation22 necessary to determine what works best for each 
individual student.23   
 Opponents of school-voucher programs fall into two categories.  First, some 
oppose voucher programs regardless of whether they include religious schools or 
                                                 
18 “School choice proponents want to ensure that the education system serves its ‘customers’ in order 
to earn its way. Currently, a public school is not accountable to the students enrolled in it or their 
parents. . . . In addition to making schools compete, school choice proponents want to make schools 
accountable to parents by making them the referees of this competition.” Nathan J. Diament, School 




20 At least one study shows improvement in standardized test scores among minorities enrolled in 
school-voucher programs. William G. Howell, et. al., Effects of School Vouchers on Student Test 
Scores, in CHARTERS, VOUCHERS, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 136, 144-45 (Paul E. Peterson & David E. 
Campbell eds., 2001) (showing increased test scores for black students in private school-choice 
scholarship programs).  See also George Will, Editorial, A New Approach to School Reform, BUFFALO 
NEWS, August 31, 2000, at 3C.  But see JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S FIRST VOUCHER PROGRAM 114-15 (1999) (finding that most of the studies  




22 In Hunter v. Regents of the University of California, the need for experimentation was used to 
justify race-based classifications for students in the UCLA Lab Schools.  These schools are an 
experiment in schooling – the students are chosen because of characteristics, such as race or income, 
so that researchers can determine which teaching methods work best for each group of students and if 
there are any differences in the way one group of children learns compared with another group. 190 
F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 
23 See Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 791 (2005) (proposing a school-voucher program for economically-disadvantaged urban 
children to attend private schools and “middle-class suburban public schools”). 
Accommodating Discrimination 
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not.24  They fear that using government funds to send children to private schools will 
drain money25 or the most gifted students26 from public schools.  The second group 
of opponents may support the voucher concept but want to exclude religious schools 
from the programs.27  One of the main concerns for this group is the separation of 
church and state.28  According to school-voucher opponents, government subsidies 
that go to religious schools are essentially the same as state sponsorship of religious 
education.29  The participation of religious schools in school-voucher programs could 
lead to increased tension between parents sending their children to religious schools 
                                                                                                                                          
 
24 See, e.g., EDD DOERR, ET. AL., THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL VOUCHERS 13-16 (1996) (including 
arguments that apply to religious schools participation and arguments that apply to any private 
schools participating in a voucher program). 
 
25 The National Education Association, the largest teachers union in the country, has “long opposed 
private school tuition vouchers – especially where funds for vouchers compete with funds for overall 
improvements in America’s public schools. …  [The NEA] oppose[s] alternatives that divert attention, 
energy, and resources from efforts to reduce class size, enhance teacher quality, and provide every 
student with books, computers, and safe and orderly schools.”  NEA Issues in Education, Vouchers 
website, available at http://www.nea.org/vouchers/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).   
 
26 For an overview of the “skimming” debate, see Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice 
to Achieve Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 817-821 (2005). 
 
27 See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 14 (1998) (suggesting that 
some forms of religious education harm children); Steven K. Green, The Constitutionality of Vouchers 
After Mitchell v. Helms, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 57, 57-64 (2000) (questioning the 
constitutionality of voucher programs that include private schools); Nadine Strossen, Religion and the 
Constitution: A Libertarian Perspective, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 42-43 (2005/2006). 
 
28 See, e.g., Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Protecting the Walls Supporting Our Schools, 
THE REFORM MOVEMENT’S CAMPAIGN FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 66TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Dec. 5-9, 
2001, at 1.  Some scholars opposed to the inclusion of religious schools have offered an alternative: 
restricting religious schools participating in the programs to secular education.  See, e.g.,  JAMES G. 
DWYER, VOUCHERS WITHIN REASON 147 (2002) (suggesting that religious schools in voucher 
programs should only be compensated for the secular education they provide); JOHN E. CHUBB & 
TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, & AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 219 (1990) (advocating a voucher 
program that includes religious schools but only if “their sectarian functions can be kept clearly 
separate from their educational functions”). 
 
29 See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religion and Liberal 
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 209-214 (1992).  
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using vouchers and taxpayers whose funds are used to finance education in religions 
they oppose.30   
 Meanwhile, many supporters of religious education fear that government 
subsidization will harm religion31 by “kill[ing it] with kindness.”32  Religious schools 
could come to rely on government support rather than their followers.33  This will 
lead to “greater institutional interoperability and dependency, subject recipient 
institutions to increasing governmental oversight, and thereby begin to quash the 
independent spirit from the religious groups upon which society depends to counter 
relatively soulless government bureaucracies.”34 
                                                 
30 For the typical divisiveness arguments, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 715-717 
(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 717-726 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Respondent’s Brief at 7-24, 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (No. 00-1751).   
 
31 Including religious organizations in public programs “triggers sharp criticisms … from those 
concerned that government aid may intrude on the autonomy and freedom of religious groups.” 
Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229, 1232 (2003).  “[M]any advocates of religious freedom oppose vouchers because they fear 
that the government will require religious schools to ‘water down’ their religious character in order to 
receive public funding.” Gia Fonte, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School Vouchers, 
Education’s Winning Lottery Ticket, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 563 (2003).  See also Nicole Stelle 
Garnett & Richard Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. 
LAW & POLI. 301, 339 (2000).   
 
32 Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separation of Church 
and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2002).  See also Nadine Strossen, Religion and the 
Constitution: A Libertarian Perspective, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 42-43 (2005/2006). 
 
33 Id. at 1067.  But see Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 354 (1999) (suggesting that “the risk of government pressure that leads 
some [religious schools] to abandon their religious obligations … is as present under the existing 
system as under a school choice system”). 
 
34 Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separation of Church 
and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (2002).  The Eagle Forum of Georgia, a Christian-based 
conservative organization, warned in a newsletter that “[b]ecause [government funding] brings … 
religion-restricting government regulations, many … religions … know better than to hand over 
control of their social service ministries to the government. … Government vouchers … will just 
bring more government, not more liberty.”  Quoted in Nadine Strossen, Religion and the Constitution: 




 Opponents of school-voucher programs share these same concerns in the 
context of charitable-choice programs.35  In that arena, several commentators have 
called for legislation that would condition participation in the program on adherence 
to employment-antidiscrimination laws.36 These scholars believe that participation 
by religious organizations in public programs should be predicated on foregoing 
exemptions from these laws.37  
 Similarly, several commentators suggest that a religious school’s limited 
ability to discriminate in employment must be curtailed if they wish to participate in 
school-voucher programs.38  This threat may lead some schools to refuse to 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 1071, 1105-1106 (2002). 
 
36 “Contract and voucher plans must have … public strings attached and enforced through adequate 
oversight and monitoring.” Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1261 (2003).  “President Bush’s promised expansion of faith-
based social service initiatives is bogged down in questions about the extent to which (if at all) 
religious social service providers should be exempt from federal antidiscrimination laws in hiring 
their employees.”  Frederick Mark Gedlicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1105 (2002).  Professor Gedlicks suggests that religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws be limited to certain central positions.  Id. at 1106. 
 
37 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229, 1261 (2003) “Publicly subsidized schooling, health care, welfare, and social services must 
… advance public values [including] freedom from exclusion or inferior treatment on the basis of 
race, national origin, ethnicity, language, gender, disability, religion, and increasingly, sexual 
orientation.” Id. “[A] state can work with religious providers of welfare and social services only if the 
providers, like the state itself, refrain from violating state and local antidiscrimination employment 
law. . . .”  Id. 
 
38 “Once the public begins to finance religious education, the regulatory concerns about design of 
curriculum, admissions, policy, and employment decisions will surface with a vengeance.” Ira Lupu, 
The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'Y 375, 395 (1999).  See also James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting the Public into the 
Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963, 992 (2001) (advocating requiring religious private 
schools to accept regulatory strings as conditions on their participation in school-voucher programs to 
ensure that the “money is being used to provide secular education, rather than to support denial of a 
good secular education and perhaps even activities that affirmatively harm children – for example, 
explicit and aggressive sexist training”); Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt from 
Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (advocating “avoiding direct confrontation [of legal 
battles] between the government and religious groups” by pursuing negotiated solutions); David 
Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1393 (2003) (“The courts have not fully addressed the validity of the exemption 
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participate in the programs.39  One of the primary reasons for supporting a school 
voucher program is the hope of giving low-income children access to improved 
educational opportunities.40  Fewer schools participating in the program,41 however, 
would diminish the hopes of gains in student performance extolled by voucher 
proponents.  
 This Article considers the involvement by religious schools in a school 
voucher program and the effect this could have on the schools’ employment 
practices. 42  Part I examines current employment-discrimination law for religious 
                                                                                                                                          
where government-funded programs or positions are involved. . . .  It did not … address the issue of 
government-funded entities or positions.  Lower court decisions doing so have been split.”).   
 
39 See Douglas Dewey, Separating School and State: A Prudential Analysis of Tax-Funded Vouchers, 
in Vouchers and Educational Freedom: A Debate, 269 CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS, March 12, 
1997, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-269.html.  Mr. Dewey favors privatizing 
education (eliminating public schools) but fears that any movement towards school vouchers would 
come with strings that would strangle private schools and evaporate their success.  “[G]overnment 
money always comes with strings attached.” Id.  Several commentators have noted the analogy 
between federal financial-aid grants to students attending colleges and universities, including 
religiously affiliated institutions, and voucher programs.  See Marc D. Stern, On School Vouchers and 
the Establishment Clause: School Vouchers – The Church-State Debate That Really Isn’t, 31 CONN. 
L. REV. 977, 990 (1999) (noting that higher education institutions usually do not forgo government 
money when subsequent strings are attached).  See, also, George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: 
The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 750 (1993); 
Kimberly M. DeShano, Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses under Agostini: 
Resurrection, Insurrection, and a New Direction, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 776 (1999).   
 
40 “Power and choices make people feel more involved, more effective and more satisfied as citizens.  
Children whose parents can choose their best educational environment learn better and have a better 
chance to become productive American citizens.” William Trainor, The Controversial School 
Voucher Issue, ECONEDLINK ECONOMICSMINUTE, Dec. 8, 2000, at 
http://www.econedlink.org/lessons/index.cfm?lesson=EM185 (quoting Milton & Rose Friedman); 
Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 3-4, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (No. 00-1751); see 
generally Petitioner’s Brief, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (No. 00-1751). 
 
41 R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY, EQUITY, AND 
DIVERSITY 194 & 282 nn.1-2 (2002) (citing TERRY MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC ( 2001) and LANA MURASKIN & STEPHANIE STULLICH, FINAL REPORT: BARRIERS, BUDGETS, 
AND COSTS USING PRIVATE SCHOOLS TO ALLEVIATE OVERCROWDING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1998) to 
show that most parents support regulating private schools in voucher programs while most of those 
schools would refuse to participate in a voucher program if regulations were part of the deal). 
 
42 It is unclear whether jurisdictions employing school-voucher programs have attempted to condition 
participation in the programs on compliance with antidiscrimination employment policies.  Compare 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976(A)(6) (2008) (requiring that schools in the Cleveland program 
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schools operating outside a voucher program.  Specifically, this Part argues that the 
ability of religious schools to discriminate depends both on who they are 
discriminating against and the type of discrimination practiced.  Part II asks whether 
allowing religious schools outside school-voucher programs exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws violates the Establishment Clause.  This Part argues that the 
dominant Establishment Clause test is inappropriate when analyzing 
accommodations for religious organizations, such as exemptions from employment 
antidiscrimination laws.  In its place, I craft a new test incorporating factors from 
several Supreme Court cases to clarify the permissible from the impermissible 
accommodation.  Part III considers whether a religious school’s participation in a 
school-voucher program alters the Establishment Clause analysis for government-
created accommodations.  Part IV addresses whether the Free Exercise, either alone 
or in combination with other constitutionally guaranteed rights, mandates that state 
and local governments provide exemptions for religious schools.  Finally, Part V 
asks whether these same governments could rescind a religious school’s exemptions 
as a condition of participating in a voucher program.  This Part concludes that 
restrictions on the religious schools’ ability to discriminate with respect to certain 
employees, but not others, would create an unconstitutional condition on 
participation in voucher programs.  Overall, this Article demonstrates that, with 
some caveats, private religious schools can be included in, and cannot be excluded 
from, participation in a school-voucher program solely due to their hiring and firing 
practices. 
   
                                                                                                                                          
“do[] not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 
(2006) (requiring schools to comply with the general antidiscrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-709 (2007) (stating that “nothing in this part grants additional 
authority to any state agency or school district to regulate private schools except as expressly set forth 
in this part”).  In his Zelman v. Simmons-Harris dissent, Justice Souter suggested that the Ohio statute 
may prohibit a “participating religious school [from] choos[ing] a member of its own clergy to serve 
as teacher or principal over a layperson of a different religion claiming equal qualification for the 
job.”  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 712-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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PART I: EMPLOYMENT-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND PRIVATE 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
 
 This Part argues that religious organizations, such as religious schools, can 
currently discriminate in employment through three mechanisms.  First, like other 
employers, they can discriminate against those outside of protected classes.  I argue 
that even within these protected groups, religious organizations should be allowed an 
exemption from local antidiscrimination laws when an employee’s conduct conflicts 
with the religious organization’s moral code of conduct or tenets.  Second, religious 
organizations can discriminate based on religious affiliation because of an exemption 
from federal antidiscrimination statutes.43  Lastly, religious organizations enjoy a 
ministerial exception that allows any type of discrimination for certain key positions.  
This Part considers each of these mechanisms in turn. 
 
SECTION I.A. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON CONDUCT  
 
 Like all employers, religious organizations are permitted to discriminate 
based on characteristics not protected by antidiscrimination laws.  For example, an 
environmental-advocacy group could refuse to hire people who proclaimed their 
desire to destroy the rainforest; similarly a conservative think tank could fire 
                                                 
43 The federal law prohibiting employment discrimination is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  It 
prohibits discrimination based on “….” The prohibitions against employment discrimination based on 
religion, however, “shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, 
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of 
its activities.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2008).  Additionally, Title VII provides that “it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or 
institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, 
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, 
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious 
corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other 
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular 
religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2002).  For the remainder of this Article, these two sections will 




someone because their car sported bumper stickers supporting Barak Obama’s 
presidential campaign.44 Similarly, a religious organization can refuse to hire or 
choose to fire someone whose conduct conflicts with the religion’s moral code.45    
 One case, Little v. Wuerl, provides a good example of how religious 
organizations can discriminate based on conduct.46  Susan Long Little, a Protestant, 
taught elementary school at St. Mary Magdalene Parish, a Catholic school.47  Her 
teaching contract was not renewed because she failed to have her first marriage 
annulled before she remarried.48  Mrs. Little sued the school for religious 
discrimination.49  The school responded that Mrs. Little’s contract renewal was 
denied not because she was Protestant but because her conduct conflicted with 
Catholic tenets.50  The school claimed that they would have fired a Catholic teacher 
for the same behavior.51  The court agreed with the school, stating that “[i]t does not 
violate [antidiscrimination laws] for a parochial school to discharge a Catholic or a 
non-Catholic teacher who has publicly engaged in conduct regarded by the school as 
inconsistent with its religious principles.”52 
                                                 
44 Carl H. Esbeck, Charitable Choice and the Critics, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 17, 22 (2000). 
 
45 For example, a religious teacher may be fired from a Catholic school because her support for 
abortion conflicts with the Church’s tenets.  Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 
(7th Cir. 1987).  See also David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A 
Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1389-90 (2003); Frederick Mark Gedlicks, A Two-
Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002).   
 
46 929 F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991).   
 
47 Id. at 944. 
 
48 Id. at 946. 
 
49 Id. at 945. 
 
50 Id. at 946.  “The integration of religious truth and values with the life is brought about in the 
Catholic school not only by its unique curriculum but, more important, by the presence of teachers 
who express an integrated approach to learning and living in their private and professional lives.” Id. 
at 948 n.5 (quoting NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, TO TEACH AS JESUS DID (1972)). 
 
51 Id. at 946. 
 
52 Id. at 951. 
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 While it is a relatively straight-forward case when conduct-based 
employment decisions concern someone belonging to a group not protected by 
antidiscrimination laws, such as the would-be rainforest destroyer or the divorced-
but-not-annulled Mrs. Long, the issue becomes more complicated when the conduct 
is practiced solely by those within a group protected by federal, state, or local 
antidiscrimination laws.  For example, homosexuality53 and non-marital sexual 
relations54 are inconsistent with the beliefs of several major religious organizations.  
The Catholic Church, which dominates the religious private-school market,55 
condemns both homosexual activity and non-marital sexual relations in its tenets.  
These two groups, however, may be protected by antidiscrimination statutes.  Could 
a Catholic school legally fire an employee who marched in a gay-pride parade or 
who was unmarried and pregnant? 
 
                                                                                                                                          
 
53 Some religions consider homosexual conduct against their church’s values, while others do not.  
For example, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, religious organizations supporting and opposing the Boy Scouts’ 
employment action against a homosexual Scout leader filed amici briefs.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici 
Curiae United States Catholic Conference and New Jersey Catholic Conference at 4, Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699) (stating that “homosexual conduct is wrong”); 
Brief of Amici Curiae Aguduth Israel of America at 2, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000) (No. 99-699) (noting that this national Orthodox Jewish organization “regard[s] ... homosexual 
conduct ... [as] an abomination”); Brief of Amici Curiae The General Board of Church and Society of 
the United Methodist Church, The United Church Board For Homeland Ministries, The Religious 
Action Center Of Reform Judaism, The Diocesan Council Of The Episcopal Diocese Of Newark And 
The Unitarian Universalist Association at 3-4, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) 
(No. 99-699) (stating that “gay boys and men are [not] immoral [and, rather,] discrimination against 
gay people is immoral”). 
 
54 Religions officially opposed to premarital sex include Conservative Judaism, Orthodox Judaism, 
Catholicism, Greek Orthodox, Evangelical Lutheranism, Mormonism, and Southern Baptist.  See 
Teachings on Chastity and Premarital Sex in All Faiths, available at 
http://www.beliefnet.com/features/chastity_chart.html.  For an example of a specific prohibition, see 
Persona Human: Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, Section VII, Sacred 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (Dec. 29, 1975), available at 
http://www.newadvent.org/library/docs_df75se.htm). 
 
55 JOHN F. WITTE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S FIRST 




Section I.A.1: Conduct Concerning Groups Protected by Federal, State, or Local 
Antidiscrimination Laws 
 
Section I.A.1.a: Homosexuality 
 
 While sexual orientation is not a suspect classification under federal civil 
rights laws,56 many states and localities have recently expanded their civil rights 
codes to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.57   
 In Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation,58 the Sixth Circuit 
addressed employment discrimination by a religious organization based on sexual 
orientation.  Glynda Hall worked as a student-services specialist at the Baptist 
Memorial College of Health Sciences.59 The school was affiliated with the Southern 
Baptist Convention which “deplore[d] homosexuality as a perversion of divine 
standards and as a violation of nature and natural affections.”60  Ms. Hall became a 
lay minister at her own non-Baptist church which actively sought homosexual 
                                                 
56 DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 
57 For state and local codes prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, see Josiah N. 
Drew, Note, Caught Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Ameliorating the Collision Course of Sexual 
Orientation Anti-Discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights in the Public Workplace, 
16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 287, nn. 20-23 (2002). “Most civil rights legislation designed to protect against 
sexual orientation discrimination has taken root at the state and local levels of government. Currently, 
twelve states and the District of Columbia prohibit such workplace discrimination. [These statutes] 
[c]over[] discrimination not only in employment, but also in housing and public accommodations. . . .  
Additionally, eight states have executive orders that bar discrimination in public employment based 
upon sexual orientation.  Finally, in addition to state law, over 165 municipalities and countries have 
enacted anti-discrimination legislation based upon sexual orientation.” Id.  According to Terry 
Morehead Dworkin, “[t]here are over 100 … statutes, ordinances and executive orders” prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life - Leave Me Alone: 
Off The-Job Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, n. 79. See also Rhoda 
McMillon, Congress to Revisit Job Parity Issue, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 98. Some localities’ 
ordinances contain explicit exemptions for religious institutions.  See, e.g., Hyman v. Louisville, 132 
F. Supp. 2d 528, 545 (W.D. Kent. 2001) (discussing such exemptions in Louisville and Jefferson 
County, Kentucky ordinances).  
 
58 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 
59 Id. at 622. 
 
60 Id.  
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members.61  When Ms. Hall informed her supervisor that she was a lay minister of 
the other church, she was asked to leave her position.62  She refused and was fired 
because she was a lesbian and because she publicly opposed the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s position on homosexuality through her leadership role in her church.63  
The court held that religious organizations have the right “to terminate an employee 
whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of [the] employer.”64  
To do otherwise would mean that the court was instructing the religious organization 
about “how to carry out their religious missions or how to enforce their religious 
practices.”65  
  
Section I.A.1.b: Non-marital sexual activity 
 Religious organizations can fire men and women who violate religious tenets 
forbidding non-marital sexual relations.66  In Boyd v. Harding Academy of 
Memphis,67 a religious school affiliated with the Church of Christ fired an unmarried 
female teacher when she announced her pregnancy.68  The court found that Ms. Boyd 
was not fired because she was pregnant but because she engaged in conduct – sex 
outside of marriage – that the school’s religious affiliate opposed.69  The school 




62 Id. at 623.  The College asked her to resign as a student-services specialist and offered to place her 
in another position that did not deal with students.  Id.   
 
63 Id. at 627. 
 
64 Id. at 624. 
 
65 Id. at 626. 
 
66 Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 211, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 
67 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 
68 Id. at 412. 
 




demonstrated that on other occasions it had terminated both male and female 
employees for having sex outside of marriage.70  Additionally, the school had offered 
to maintain Ms. Boyd’s employment if she married her baby’s father.71   
 The evidence of non-marital sex often, as in Boyd, ends up being a pregnancy 
by an unmarried woman.  If the religious school cannot demonstrate that the 
prohibition against non-marital sex is applied evenhandedly72 to both male and 
female employees and not just to pregnant women, this action could run afoul of 
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on pregnancy73 as well as state and 
local pregnancy-discrimination prohibitions. 
 
Section I.A.2: Religious Schools Conduct-Based Firings and Refusals-to-Hire Based 
on Conduct, not Status.  
 
 Ms. Boyd was not fired by the Church of Christ because she was pregnant but 
rather because her pregnancy was evidence that she, an unmarried woman, had 
engaged in non-marital sex.  The church would have fired her if it had discovered her 
conduct through some means other than her pregnancy.  The pregnancy did not get 
her fired – it was the activity that got her pregnant that got her fired. 
 Similarly, when the Baptist Community Health Care Association fired Ms. 
Hall, it did so because she was actively participating in activities that directly 
conflicted with the church’s teachings.  She was not fired because she was a lesbian, 
but because she was promoting homosexuality.  When a firing or a refusal-to-hire is 
based on conduct, it must be separated from a similar action based on an employee’s 
                                                 
70 Id.  “There were no situations described at trial in which [the school] was aware of an employee’s 
sexual activity outside of marriage and failed to take action.” Id. at 412. 
 
71 Id.  
 
72 Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 211, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2002) prohibits “sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.  See also 
Cline v. Catholic Diocese, 206 F.3d 651, 658-659 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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status within the protected group.  So, for example, if Ms. Hall (a lesbian) was not in 
a homosexual relationship nor outwardly refuting church teachings, there would have 
been no argument that the church fired her based on her status alone.   
 To deny religious organizations the ability to fire or to refuse-to-hire 
employees based on this conduct seriously infringes on the church’s ability to 
convey their message.  How seriously would congregants or religious followers heed 
church tenets and teachings if obvious and vocal evidence of an employee’s disdain 
for those teachings was ignored?  To force religious organizations to condone what 
their teachings proscribe as sinful would be the equivalent of government dictating 
the religious message.    
  
SECTION I.B. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: THE TITLE VII 
EXEMPTION 
 
 Title VII generally proscribes employment discrimination based on religion, 
sex, race or national origin,74 but provides a limited exemption for religious 
discrimination by religious organizations, including schools.75  This exemption 
applies to positions that are religious, such as clergy, and to those that are not, such 
as janitorial staff.76  A religious employer may require all, some, or none of its 
employees to be religious followers.77  For example, the Roman Catholic 
                                                 
74 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2002). 
 
75 See supra note 43. Most state employment-discrimination statutes also allow an exemption for 
religious discrimination by religious organizations.  See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission, 766 F.2d 932, 941 n.18 (6th Cir. 1985) (listing all the state statutes in force in 
1985), reversed on abstention grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).  
 
76 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding against Establishment Clause challenge the termination of a janitorial 
staff member who did not secure a certificate showing his qualifications for temple under the Mormon 
faith).   
 
77 Of course, some faiths may choose not to exclude those whose conduct violates church teachings in 
an effort to educate or reform the wayward.  The issue here, however, is whether government 
legislation should force them to adopt this position.   
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Archdiocese of Chicago, which runs the largest non-public school system in the 
nation,78 requires all new teachers to earn four “Continuing Education Units” in 
Catholic Doctrine within the first three years of their employment.79  In 1984, the 
Diocese of Pittsburgh announced a Catholics-only hiring policy and required any 
school hiring a non-Catholic to obtain special permission.80   
 The Title VII exemption, however, does not allow religious organizations to 
discriminate based on the statute’s other proscribed bases – race, sex, or national 
origin.81  For example, a religious publisher cannot adjust employees pay according 
to their gender and marital status without violating Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
                                                                                                                                          
 
78 Cathleen Falsani & Rosalind Rossi, Saving Schools has Price, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, 
Late Sports Final Edition, at 6. 
 
79 Policy 220.1, EVANGELIZATION AND CATECHESIS NEWS, Archdiocese of Chicago, October 2001. 
 
80 See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 946 (3d Cir. 1991).  It is not unusual for religiously-affiliated 
higher-education institutions to require employees to belong to a particular faith.  For example, 
Regent’s University requires all “trustees, officers, administrators, and faculty” to attest to the 
following statements:  
1. That the Holy Bible is the inspired, infallible and authoritative source of Christian 
doctrine and precept. 
2. That there is one God, eternally existent in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. 
3. That man was created in the image of God but, as a result of sin, is lost and powerless to 
save himself. 
4. That the only hope for man is to believe [in] the Lord Jesus Christ, the virgin-born son 
of God, who died to take upon Himself the punishment for the sin of mankind, and who 
rose from the dead, so that by receiving Him as Savior and Lord, man is redeemed by 
His blood. 
5. That Jesus Christ will personally return to Earth in power and glory. 
6. That the Holy Spirit indwells those who receive Christ, for the purpose of enabling them 
to live righteous and holy lives. 
7. That the Church is the body of Christ and is comprised of all those who through belief in 
Christ have been spiritually regenerated by the indwelling Holy Spirit.  The mission of 
the Church is worldwide evangelization and the nurture and discipling of Christians. 
Regent University, Employee Handbook, Section I Introduction, Statement of Faith, updated Feb. 18, 
2005.  “The board of trustees, along with the faculty and staff of the University, are committed to an 
evangelical interpretation and application of the Christian faith.”  Id. 
 
81 See, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1999); Hopkins v. Women’s 
Division, General Board of Global Ministries, The United Methodist Church, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 
180-81 (D.D.C. 2002).   
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discrimination.82  Determining whether an employment decision was either permitted 
religious discrimination or prohibited sex, race, or national origin discrimination 
presents the chief factual issues courts face in this area.83   
 
SECTION I.C. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
 
Courts generally refuse to apply Title VII altogether when fired employees 
who serve in clearly religious positions, such as clergy, allege employment-
discrimination claims.84  This so-called “ministerial exception,” a court-made 
doctrine that is based on constitutional grounds, forecloses inquiry into 
discrimination claims that would otherwise fall outside the Title VII exemption, such 
as claims of race, sex, and national origin discrimination.85   
                                                 
82 EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982).   
 
83 Several cases suggest that, at least in some cases, the EEOC may not even conduct a thorough 
investigation into why employees were terminated.  For example, in EEOC v. Mississippi College, the 
Fifth Circuit found that the EEOC could not investigate a claim where the college said the adverse 
employment action was religious discrimination while the former employee claimed that it was race 
discrimination.  626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). “We conclude that if a religious institution of the 
kind described in [the Title VII exemption] presents convincing evidence that the challenged 
employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of religion, [the Title VII exemption] 
deprives the EEOC of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the religious 
discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination.” Id.  The EEOC can, however, 
investigate claims based on prohibited forms of discrimination when convincing evidence is not 
presented by the religious organization.  Ninth & O Street Baptist Church v. EEOC, 616 F. Supp. 
1231, 1233 (W.D. Ky. 1985).   
 
84 Courts have also refused to apply other employment-related federal statutes such as the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 305 (4th 
Cir. 2004); the Americans with Disabilities Act, Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 
1999); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 
1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006); and the Family Medical Leave Act, Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help 
Roman Catholic Church, No. 05-CV-0404, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22546, at *20 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 5, 
2005) when faced with a ministerial plaintiff.  But see Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 
951, 964 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a sexual-harassment claim could proceed despite the plaintiff’s 
ministerial status); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, 7 F. 3d 324 (3d Cir. 
1993) (holding that age-discrimination suit was not barred by the ministerial exception). 
 
85 “[C]ourts have consistently found that Title VII does not apply to the relationship between ministers 
and the religious organizations that employ them, even where discrimination is alleged on the basis of 
race or sex.” Little v. Wuehl, 929 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir. 1991).  The ministerial exception “prohibit[s] 
a church from being sued under Title VII by its clergy.” Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal 
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Courts invoking the ministerial exception state that its rationale lies in both 
the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses.86  Courts typically hold that if 
government may dictate that a religious organization employ certain individuals as 
ministers, it will inexorably hamper those organizations’ ability of the organization 
to “select those who will carry out its mission.”87  “[T]he church as an institution 
must retain the … right to select its voice.”88  On the Establishment Clause side, 
having the state essentially choosing whom a church may select as its leader begins 
to look similar to a government-sponsored church.89  Even beyond this concern, 
though, having the government involved in hiring decisions concerning the leaders 
                                                                                                                                          
Church, Inc. 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).  “The exception precludes any inquiry whatsoever 
into the reasons behind a church’s ministerial employment decision for the Free Exercise Clause 
protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.”  EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).   
 
86 See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 
2002); Bollard v. The California Province of the Society of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331, 1331 (9th Cir. 
2000) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Gellington v. Christian Methodist 
Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).  See also Michael McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 
687-88 (1992) (discussing how accommodations for religious activities fall within both Religion 
Clauses); Samina Quddos, Accommodating Religion, 6 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 67, 69-72 (2001) 
(same). 
 
87 Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 
(5th Cir. 1999) (quoting EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 
1996)). 
 
88 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
89 “Application of external social norms to religious providers’ hiring decisions resembles government 
control over the leadership of the government-established church, particularly if the position being 
filled requires significant managerial or leadership responsibilities.” Frederick Mark Gedlicks, A Two-
Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071 (2002).  The district court explained 
the problem of not applying the ministerial exception as follows: “The state, through [the] court, 
would involve itself in theological questions and then, if finding [against the religious organization], 
impose upon [them] the Court’s judgment as to what compromises adherence to the … faith.” 
Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (E.D. Wis. 1986). 
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of a faith would amount to excessive entanglement between the government and 
church affairs.90  
In Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
Church,91 the Fifth Circuit applied the ministerial exception to dismiss a sex 
discrimination claim.  In that case, Reverend Pamela Combs announced her 
pregnancy92 and, following the birth of her child, the church fired her.93  The 
church’s decision did not rest on religious differences that would have excused the 
employment action under the Title VII exemption.94  Instead, the defendant claimed 
that its decision was shielded by the ministerial exception.  The court agreed and 
found that “the First Amendment deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a 
Title VII employment-discrimination suit brought against a church by a member of 
its clergy, even when the church’s challenged actions are not based on religious 
doctrine.”95 The church had a “fundamental right . . . to be free from government 
interference in [its] internal management and administration.”96 
 Unlike the Title VII exemption, the ministerial exception is deep in 
application, but narrow in scope in that it only applies to certain positions.  While 
clergy and church leaders are included, janitors and maintenance workers are not.97  
                                                 
90 Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985).   
 
91 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999).   
 





94 “Reverend Combs’s claims are based purely on sex and pregnancy and do not directly involve 
matters of religious dogma or ecclesiastical law.” Id. at 345 n.1 
 
95 Id. at 345. 
 
96 Id. at 350. 
 
97 Miller v. Bay View United Methodist, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (finding that 
the ministerial exception applies to employees whose “‘primary duties consist of teaching, spreading 
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in 
religious ritual and worship’” (quoting Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 
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Determining to whom the exception applies depends on the functions of the position.  
If the job entails leading a church congregation or spreading the faith, the exception 
will apply.98  From the case law, it appears that teachers can be included in the 
ministerial exception,99 although whether their position involves spreading the faith 
will ultimately be a question for the court.100  In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, a case 
holding that the National Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction over lay teachers 
at religious schools, the Supreme Court “recognized the critical and unique role of 
the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school.”101  In a more recent 
case, the Fourth Circuit held that the ministerial exception protected a religious 
school that fired a music teacher because music was an “integral portion of the 
spiritual message.”102    
                                                                                                                                          
772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1986));  EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 
797 (4th Cir. 2000); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (finding kosher food inspector subject to the ministerial exception); Alicea-Hernandez v. 
The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding ministerial exception 
applied to press secretary who was “responsible for conveying the message of an organization to the 
public as a whole); Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. 3:01CV2352(MRK), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5611, at *5-*6 (D. Conn. March 30, 2004) (finding ministerial exception applied to 
pastoral assistant whose duties included reading scripture, distributing communion, and training 
Eucharistic ministers and readers).  But see Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. 
Supp. 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding teacher whose duties included teaching one hour per day of bible 
study was not a ministerial employee); Whitney v. Greater New York Corporation of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (ministerial exception did not apply to typist-
receptionist). 
 
98 See infra Sections III.C and IV.A. 
 
99 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that the ministerial 
exception applies to “all employees ... whose primary functions serve [the religious organization’s] 
spiritual and pastoral mission”). 
 
100 See, e.g., Miller v. Bay View United Methodist, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 2001) 
(“The applicability of the ministerial exception is a question of law for the court.”). 
 
101 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).  While not a ministerial-exception case, 
Catholic Bishop held that allowing the National Labor Relations Board to force church schools into 
collective bargaining negotiations could lead to “serious First Amendment questions.”  Id. at 504. 
 
102 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that the ministerial 
exception applies to all employees whose responsibilities include teaching, spreading the faith, or any 
other integral part of the spiritual message). 
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 The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the court-made ministerial 
exception to antidiscrimination laws.  The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 
however, seem to require that government take a hands-off approach with respect to 
the internal structure of religious organizations.103  In an older case related to the 
internal structure of a church but not related to employment, the Supreme Court said 
that the First Amendment required “an independence from secular control or 
manipulation – in short, power [for religious organizations] to decide for themselves, 
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith 
and doctrine.”104  
 
PART II: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND 
ACCOMMODATIONS 
 
Despite several recent cases concerning the Establishment Clause,105 the full 
test of what violates the Clause remains unclear.  Scholars continue to debate 
whether the Establishment Clause requires a separationist theory or a neutrality 
theory of enforcement.106  Should church and state be mutually exclusive realms 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 126 (Md. 2001). Montgomery 
County, Maryland made discrimination based on religion illegal except for employees who “perform 
purely religious functions” for religious organizations. Id. at 114.  The Maryland Court of Appeals 
found that the provision violated the United States Constitution (and the Maryland constitution) 
because it did not provide a ministerial exception as required by the Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 122-
28.  The court reasoned that even a minister’s job is not “purely” religious and, therefore, 
discrimination in his hiring would violate the ordinance.  Id. at 128.  See also Stephanie Kaye Baron, 
A Missed Opportunity to Take a Clear Stance on the Constitutionality of Discriminatory Employment 
Practices by Religious Organizations, The Maryland Survey 2000-2001,, 61 MD. L. REV. 869, 869 
(2002) (discussing Montrose).   
 
104 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
   
105 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000). 
 
106 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 335-492 (2002); Patrick M. Garry, 
Religious Freedom Deserves More than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential 
Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2005); Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of 
the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1101 (2002) (“The basic insight provided by the 
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where no governmental assistance flows to religious institutions; or should 
government provide benefits in a religiously-blind fashion even if that means 
taxpayer dollars end up in religious coffers?  In cases concerning aid to religious 
schools, the neutrality theory appears to have declared victory.107  With respect to 
accommodations for religious organizations, such as exemptions from employment-
discrimination laws, however, the neutrality theory appears ill-suited.108  Yet, the 
Supreme Court claims to apply the same analysis to both aid and accommodation 
cases: the three-pronged test first posited in Lemon v. Kurtzman.109 
                                                                                                                                          
two-track theory of the Establishment Clause is that separation, not neutrality, is the more 
fundamental Establishment Clause value.”); Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential 
Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111 
(2002); Douglas Laycock, The Religion Clauses in the 21st Century: Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 
110 W. VA. L. REV. 51 (2007); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separationism and 
Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994); Matthew Gaus, Note, Locke v. Davey: Discretion, Discrimination, and 
the New Free Exercise, 54 KAN. L. REV. 533, 555-561 (2006); Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking it Out of 
Neutral: The Application of Locke’s Substantial Interest Test to the School Voucher Debate, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1275-1281 (2005). 
 
107 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (educational material and equipment loans did not 
violate the Establishment Clause partly because the loans were available to both secular and non-
secular schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (federal funds for research on premarital 
adolescent sexuality did not violate the Establishment Clause partly because the program did not 
consider religious affiliation in allocating funds); Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American 
Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 326-43 (2002) (discussing the Establishment Clause’s 
five subsidiary doctrines: primary effect and incidental benefit; secular deism; endorsement/symbolic 
union; accommodation for religious freedom, but not for religion; and non-discriminatory inclusion of 
religion). 
 
108 Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 
326-43 (2002); “[T]he principle of [absolute]neutrality … would create a test that Congress could 
rarely, if ever, meet in attempting to lift regulatory burdens on religious entities or individuals.”  
Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 2003).  See also Board of Education of Kiryas Joel 
Village School v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (finding a school district designed to include only 
members of a strict Jewish group violated the Establishment Clause because the boundary was not 
drawn in a neutral manner); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724-25 (2005) (plurality opinion); 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 727 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 
109 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  The test has been used to allow: loans of secular 
textbooks to religious schools, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 
349 (1975); constrained construction grants to religiously-affiliated colleges, Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672 (1971); reimbursement of standardized testing costs to religious schools, Comm. For 
Public Ed. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); neutrally applied tax deductions for parents of school 
children, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); tuition expenses for handicapped students attending 
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This Part argues that allowing private religious schools to discriminate in 
their employment practices does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court has previously held that the Title VII exemption is 
constitutional.  But what about conduct-based discrimination and the so-called 
ministerial exception?  Are these accommodations constitutional?  And what test 
should be used to assess their validity?  Section II.A. argues that the Lemon test has 
been unofficially modified through recent cases to include some concerns that should 
be relevant to any consideration of an accommodation for religious organizations.  
Section II.B. examines the few cases concerning accommodations and formulates a 
new test for evaluating accommodations under the Establishment Clause.  In Section 
II.C, I apply this new test to conduct-based discrimination and the ministerial 
exception and find that neither violates the Establishment Clause. 
   
SECTION II.A. THE SUPREME COURT’S CATCH-ALL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST 
 
 In 1971, the United States Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged test for 
determining violations of the Establishment Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman.110  Under 
                                                                                                                                          
religious colleges, Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); grants to 
religious schools to develop secular sex education programs, Bowen v. Kendrick, 484 U.S. 942 
(1987); on-premises sign-language interpreters and public special-education teachers at religious 
schools, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (sign-language interpreter), 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (special education teachers for low-income children); 
government-provided instructional materials at religious schools, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000); and school-voucher programs that include religious schools, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639 (2002).  The test has also been used to forbid salary supplements for religious school 
teachers, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); and tuition tax credits for parents of private 
school children, Comm. for Public Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).  In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 718 n.6 (2005) (plurality opinion), an accommodations case, the Court cited the Lemon test 
but did not apply it.  See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685-86 (2005) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that Lemon has been applied inconsistently). 
 
110 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Not all Justices, however, agree that the Lemon test 
provides a useful tool for analysis.  Justice Scalia, for example, called the Lemon test the “ghoul in a 
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly 
killed and buried.”  Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  
Justice Scalia, however, later joined the Zelman majority opinion which was based on a Lemon 




that test, a statute cannot withstand an Establishment Clause challenge unless it (1) 
has a secular legislative purpose, (2) does not have the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion, and (3) does not excessively entangle government and 
religion.111   
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the statute in question have a 
secular purpose.112  While statutes usually have little problem satisfying this 
prong,113 the Court has found several unconstitutional when no plausible secular 
purpose was put forth.  In Stone v. Graham, for example, the Court had little trouble 
finding an Establishment Clause violation when reviewing a Kentucky statute that 
required that each public-school classroom display the Ten Commandments.114  The 
statute’s purpose was “plainly religious in nature”115 and “no legislative recitation of 
a supposed secular purpose [could] blind [the Court] to that fact.”116 Likewise, in 
Wallace v. Jaffree,117 a case involving an Alabama statute authorizing moments of 
silence “for meditation,” “voluntary prayer,” and teacher-led prayer with “willing 
                                                 
111 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 
112 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 
113 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (finding a program that provided books for 
nonpublic pupils easily met Lemon’s first prong, but ultimately failed to meet the other Establishment 
Clause requirements); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (same 
for a program that provided tax breaks for parents sending their children to private schools); Mueller 
v. Allen, 436 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (“Little time need be spent on the question of whether the 
Minnesota tax deduction has a secular purpose. Under our prior decisions, governmental assistance 
programs have consistently survived this inquiry even when they have run afoul of other aspects of 
the Lemon framework. This reflects, at least in part, our reluctance to attribute unconstitutional 
motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be 
discerned from the face of the statute.”) (citations omitted).   
 
114 Stone v. Graham, 499 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980). 
 
115 Id. at 41. 
 
116 Id.  
 
117 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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students,”118 the Court found that the actual purpose was to foster prayer and, 
therefore, the statute lacked the requisite secular intent.119 
 Impermissible effect, the second Lemon prong, has been historically the most 
difficult for a statute to satisfy.120  Any effect that advances or inhibits religion 
causes a statute to fail this prong.  For example, the Court struck down several New 
York statutes that provided “maintenance and repair” grants to religious schools and 
tax credits for tuition costs of private-school students because the programs advanced 
religion.121  The Court found that the “maintenance and repair” grants were not 
sufficiently tailored to ensure that none of the grant money was ever used for 
buildings providing religious instruction.122  Likewise, the Court invalidated the tax 
credits because they encouraged parents to send their children to religious schools, 
thus benefiting religion.123     
 The last prong of the traditional Lemon test requires that the statute not create 
an excessive entanglement between the religious organization and the government124 
for fear of “interfere[nce] with the independence of [religious] institutions.”125  
Lemon itself invalidated a state program that provided salary supplements for private 
                                                 
118 Id. at 40. 
 
119 Id. at 56. 
 
120 “As usual in Establishment Clause cases, the more difficult question is whether the primary effect 
of the challenged statute is impermissible.”  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 (1988) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
121 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1973). 
 
122 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775-77 (1973).  Similarly, in Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971), a twenty-year prohibition on use of government funded 
buildings for religious instruction was insufficient to ensure that there was no advancement of 
religion.  The Court held that the prohibition had to be for the life of the building. Id.  
  
123 Conversely, the Court has upheld programs that allow tax deductions for all parents, including 
those that send their children to religious schools under the neutrality theory.  Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U.S. 388, 397 (1983). 
 
124 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) 
 
125 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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school teachers based on this prong.126  The “careful governmental controls and 
surveillance by state authorities in order to ensure that state aid support[ed] only 
secular education” amounted to excessive entanglement because the government 
would have to monitor the teachers and decide what education was secular and what 
was not.  In other words, to ensure Lemon’s second prong was not violated, the 
government would have to be excessively entangled, thus violating its third prong.127   
 Early cases that employed the Lemon test followed a separationist logic and 
suggested that any involvement between government and religion was likely to 
violate the Establishment Clause.  Even if a program’s purpose was purely secular, 
the diversion of government resources to religion,128 the religious dollars the 
government program freed up to be used for religious purposes,129 the entanglement 
necessary between government and religion to ensure that government funds were 
not being used for religious purposes,130 and the divisiveness caused by perceived 
government favoritism among religions131 or towards the religious versus the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
126 Id. at 613-14. 
 
127 Id. at 619. 
 
128 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973); Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (concerning non-book instruction materials and equipment), overruled in 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 
129 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 417-18 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) overruled in Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997). 
 
130 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977) 
(holding that government monitoring of religious school’s government-funded field trip selections 
would lead to excessive entanglement). 
 
131 County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (quoting 
Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
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areligious132 meant virtually any involvement between government and religion was 
unconstitutional.133    
In Agostini v. Felton,134 the Court modified its Establishment Clause test in 
two ways.  First, the Court explicitly collapsed Lemon’s third prong – excessive 
entanglement – into the test’s second prong – impermissible effect.135  Second, the 
Court implicitly changed how it analyzed what constitutes an “impermissible effect.”   
In addition to entanglement, two factors began to appear central to the Court’s 
analysis of the second prong: neutrality136 and endorsement.137  Finding that it was 
the private decisions of individual parents that directed Title I aid to religious 
schools, the Court held that the program had no impermissible effect138 because the 
state was not indoctrinating children with religion.139  And because it was 
administered neutrally, the program involved no government endorsement of 
religion.140 
                                                 
132 Id.; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588-89 (1992). 
 
133 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), appears to be the exception that proves the rule.  The 
Court found that the government program providing construction grants to religious colleges was 
constitutional only if there were permanent limits on the use of the buildings precluding any and all 
religious use.  Id. at 682-83.  Because the case concerned buildings, Lemon’s entanglement prong was 
satisfied because the Court believed that monitoring a building’s activities in Tilton was less intrusive 
than watching a teacher’s classroom discussion, as would have been necessary under the program at 
issue in Lemon. Id. at 687-88.    
 
134 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (considering a New York City program which placed public-school teachers 
in religious schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged students). 
 
135 Id. at 232-33.   
 
136  See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 
U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986). 
 
137 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654-55 (2002); County of Allegheny v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
138 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997). 
 
139 Id. (citing Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).   
 
140 Id. at 234-35.   
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The Court uses the twin pillars of neutrality and endorsement to illuminate 
the “impermissible effect” prong.  While neutrality has always played an important 
role in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,141 it has recently taken on new 
importance.  In Mitchell v. Helms,142 Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, criticized 
the plurality for giving the neutrality “factor singular importance” because she 
believed it should be just one of several factors considered.143  In fact, Justice 
O’Connor joined the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris144 majority that approved a school 
voucher program partly because the program was applied neutrally.145  All schools – 
religious or secular - could participate in the program.146   
Even if a program is neutral, however, targeted government funding could be 
equivalent to an endorsement of religion and, thus, create the prohibited 
impermissible effect. 147  In Mitchell v. Helms, Justice O’Connor concentrated on the 
program’s combination of neutrality and non-endorsement.148  According to Justice 
                                                                                                                                          
 
141 Id. at 231. 
 
142 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  The program provided school classroom equipment, such 
as audio-visual equipment, globes, laboratory equipment, and maps, to schools where a certain portion 
of the student body was poor.  The program included religious schools.  Id. at 802. 
 
143 Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice Souter, in his dissent, also criticized the plurality for 
the weight they placed on the program’s neutrality. Id. at 900 (Souter, J., dissenting).   
 
144 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 
145 Id.    
 
146 Id. at 653.   
 
147 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor first 
suggested the “endorsement test” in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (finding a crèche included in a holiday display along with secular symbols on public 
property did not violate the Establishment Clause because the government did not endorse the 
crèche’s religious message). While Justice O’Connor continued to apply the endorsement test, she 
found an Establishment Clause violation only once, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 634 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding a stand-alone crèche 
suggested government endorsement and was unconstitutional). 
 
148 Id. at 838-842 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Specifically, Justice O’Connor focused on perceived 
endorsement through significant diversion of government resources.   
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O’Connor, no reasonable observer would believe the government was endorsing 
religious education by providing maps, globes, and audio-visual equipment.149   
 The endorsement theory depends on either the government’s purpose in 
enacting the statute150 or the actual effect of the statute.151  Statutes fail this 
Establishment Clause test when the government speaker intends to promote religion 
or religious practice or when a reasonable observer would perceive the statute as an 
endorsement of religion or religious practice.152  Government endorsement – either 
actual or perceived – violates the Establishment Clause because it “sends a message 
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community.”153    
 
SECTION II.B. A NEW TEST FOR ASSESSING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS 
 
“The government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious 
practices.”154 But analyzing accommodations for religion or religious exercise based 
                                                                                                                                          
 
149 In previous cases, the Court had found the opposite. Id. at 804, 808 (overruling Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349 (1971) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)). These earlier cases held that 
government provision of school equipment would allow religious schools to devote more resources to 
religious teaching and, thus, government would be assisting the religious mission of the schools.  Id. 
at 804.  Based on this rationale, outsiders could reasonably believe that government was providing the 
equipment in order to make it easier for religious schools to indoctrinate children.   
 
150 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The purpose prong of 
the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove religion.”). 
 
151 Id. at 690-91 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of 





153 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
154 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987).  But not all Justices agree.  
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997), suggests 
that any government measure that shows a “preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion” violates 
the Establishment Clause.  Thus, no accommodation would pass muster.   
Accommodating Discrimination 
31  
on the tripartite Lemon criteria creates a paradox.155  After all, the very purpose of all 
religious accommodations is to assist religion and their effect may very well benefit 
religious organizations relative to secular ones.156  It is hard to imagine any 
accommodation that would not violate a pure application of Lemon.  On the other 
hand, if accommodations are merely removing government-imposed burdens that 
unequally harmed religious entities relative to secular ones or violated the Free 
Exercise Clause, the accommodation’s purpose looks more “secular” and its effect 
less like assisting religion than removing government limitations on religious 
practice.157  Without guidance from the Court and due to these difficulties, courts 
have continued to contort Lemon when considering accommodations for religion or 
religious exercise under the Establishment Clause.158  This Section formulates a new 
                                                                                                                                          
 
155 One court called the test for accommodations a refined Lemon test.  Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. 
of the Holy Child, 224 F.3d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 2000).  See also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with 
Accommodations, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment 
Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); 
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 700-02 (1992) (distinguishing accommodations that remove a significant 
obstacle to the exercise of religious belief from those that induce a person to adopt a religion in order 
to benefit from the accommodation).   
 
156 David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1370 (2003). 
 
157 “There exists an overriding interest in keeping the government – whether it be the legislature or the 
courts – out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.  The risk 
that governmental approval of some or disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one 
religion over another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”  United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  “[I]t is a 
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of 
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”  Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).   
 
158 “At some point accommodation may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion. . . .” 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 
(1987). Amos, perhaps the most well-known accommodations case, has been called “one of the most 
deferential and least logically convincing Establishment Clause analyses ever undertaken by the 
Court.” Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative 
Power, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1994). “The line between benevolent neutrality and permissible 
accommodation, on the one hand, and improper sponsorship or interference, on the other, must be 
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test for accommodations by incorporating neutrality and endorsement to clarify the 
line between permissible and impermissible accommodations.159   
 
Section II.B.1: The Courts and Accommodations 
 
 In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Title VII exemption against an Establishment Clause challenge.160  Specifically, the 
Court considered whether the religious employer could discharge an employee who 
could not show that he was a member of the Church even though the employee’s job 
was not of a religious nature.161  In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the 
Title VII exemption met the requirements of the three-pronged Lemon test.162  The 
Court reasoned that the Title VII exemption served a secular legislative purpose 
because it “alleviate[d] significant governmental interference with the ability of 
religious organizations to define and carry out their missions.”163  The Court added 
                                                                                                                                          
delicately drawn both to protect the free exercise of religion and to prohibit its establishment.” Ehlers-
Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, 224 F.3d 283, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2000).  See also Carl H. 
Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Government Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service 
Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 18 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An 
Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992) (arguing that 
accommodation is required because of the Free Exercise Clause while neutrality is required by the 
Establishment Clause). Professor Ira Lupu says this “might be seen as double-dipping by religious 
institutions, which rely on their sectarian character in their quest for autonomy in selecting employees 
while simultaneously seeking a place as a religion-neutral dispenser of government benefits.”  Ira C. 
Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of 
the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 820 (2001).   
  
159 Some accommodations may be mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.  See infra Part IV.  Section 
II.B only concerns what accommodations satisfy the Establishment Clause.   
 
160 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (using a Lemon test analysis to determine whether the exemption violated the 
Establishment Clause).   
 
161 Id. at 331.  Amos concerned a janitor who failed to secure a temple recommend which is a sign of 
adherence to the tenets of Mormonism.  Id. at 330-32. 
 
162 Id. at 335. 
 
163 Id.  
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that “[w]here … government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that 
burdens the exercise of religion, [there is] no reason to require that the exemption 
come packaged with benefits to secular entities.”164 Further, the Court held that the 
exemption did not advance or inhibit religion165 nor did it amount to an excessive 
entanglement between church and state.166   
Just two years later, the Supreme Court considered another accommodation 
for religion in Texas Monthly v. Bullock.167  At issue was a Texas statute that 
provided a tax exemption for religious, but not secular, periodicals.168  In upholding 
the program against an Establishment Clause challenge, the Texas Court of Appeals 
said the state designed the exemption to limit the state’s involvement with 
religion.169   The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the program 
unconstitutionally singled out religious periodicals for a benefit not available to 
other, non-religious periodicals that were also providing benefits to the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
164 Id. at 338. 
 
165 Id. at 337.  The Court stated that “a law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches 
to advance religion, which is their very purpose.”  Id.  The “Government itself” did not use its 
influence to advance religion.  Id.  
 
166 Id. at 339.  The Court noted that the intention of the exemption was to alleviate much of the 
entanglement that would be caused by government involvement in religious organization’s hiring 
decisions.  Id. at 336.  They left open whether applying the exemption to for-profit religious entities 
violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 339; id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).  This could raise 
interesting questions regarding for-profit religious schools participating in school-voucher programs, 
although the author is not aware of any such schools participating in existing programs.  As such, the 
topic of this Article is limited to non-profit religious organizations.   
 
167 Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 
168 Id. at 5-6. 
 
169 Id. at 6-7.  The Texas Court of Appeals had applied the Lemon test.  Specifically, the exemption 
(1) served to preserve the separation between church and state, (2) had the effect of “permit[ting] 
religious organizations to be independent of government support or sanction,” and (3) did not entangle 
government and religious organizations because the state’s tax authorities based qualification for the 
exemption on the publisher’s status as a religious organization and did not require a level of 
religiousness in the publications.  Id. 
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community.170  Unlike the accommodation in Amos, there was no evidence that 
requiring religious periodicals to pay sales taxes would hinder religious activity and 
“[n]o concrete need to accommodate religious activity [had] been shown.”171  The 
Court noted that only accommodations that do not “impose substantial burdens on 
nonbeneficiaries”172 or “that were designed to alleviate government intrusions that 
might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause”173 could pass constitutional muster.  An example of such a 
permissible accommodation would be one designed to avoid excessive entanglement 
between church and state.174   
 More recently,175 the Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson.176  In upholding the provisions of the Act concerning prison inmate’s 
religious expression rights, the Court mentioned but did not apply the Lemon test.177  
Instead, the Court found that the challenged provisions of RLUIPA “alleviate[d] 
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise,”178 required 
                                                 
170 Id. at 14. 
 
171 Id. at 18. 
 
172 Id.  
 
173 Id.  
 
174 Id.  “[Amos] prevented potentially serious encroachments on protected religious freedoms. Texas’ 
tax exemption, by contrast, does not remove a demonstrated and possibly grave imposition on 
religious activity sheltered by the Free Exercise Clause.”  Id.   
 
175 The Court found a narrow religious accommodation unconstitutional in Board of Education of 
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).  In that case, New York provided 
a special school district for one religious group.  Id. at 690.  See infra notes 195-196 and 
accompanying text for more discussion of this case.  
 
176 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 
177 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.6 (2005). 
 




“courts [to] take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may 
impose on nonbeneficiaries,”179 and the “prescriptions [were] and will be 
administered neutrally among different faiths.”180  The Court, however, neither 
explained why it did not apply the Lemon test nor whether its current analysis is 
meant to either replace or bolster a traditional Lemon analysis.181   
  
Section II.B.2: A New Test for Accommodations  
 
 It is obvious that some accommodations are constitutionally required, such as 
those mandated by the Free Exercise Clause182 while other accommodations are 
prohibited because they would violate the Establishment Clause.183  The bulk of 
accommodations may lie between the two clauses – not forbidden by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.  At issue here is 
how we test which of these accommodations are permissible and which are not.  The 
uncomfortable fit when applying Lemon to accommodations and the tensions 
between Amos, Texas Monthly, and Cutter demonstrate the need for a clearer 
Establishment Clause test for accommodations.   
It is clear that any new accommodations test must be rooted in the principle 
that government should not act to favor religion over non-religion.184 The 
government, however, must acknowledge and appreciate the differences between 
                                                 
179 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
 
180 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
 
181 Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Cutter v. Wilkinson, is clear: Lemon should not be used and 
is “discredited.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 
182 For example, it may be required by the Free Exercise Clause that Catholic churches be granted 
exemptions from drinking-age laws to allow younger members to fully participate in communion. 
 
183 It would clearly violate the Establishment Clause if Catholic churches but not other faiths were 
exempted from drinking-age laws. 
 
184 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994). 
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religion and non-religion in order to not disfavor one over the other.185 Properly 
tailored accommodations provide one mechanism for government to neither favor 
nor disfavor religion.  An accommodation satisfies this requirement when it concerns 
an activity central to religious practice, treats religions neutrally, cannot reasonably 
be viewed as a government endorsement of religion or the religious practice, and its 
absence would excessively entangle government and religion.  The Court should 
adopt this four-part test for Establishment Clause analysis of accommodations and 
finally bury the ill-fitting Lemon test.  
 The first element of the new test - allowing religion to be religious - replaces 
Lemon’s first prong which looked at whether a statute’s purpose was secular.  By 
definition, accommodations for religious organizations cannot have a purely secular 
purpose.186  After all, accommodations act by exempting religious organizations 
from laws that non-religious entities must continue to follow.  Application of 
Lemon’s first prong would invalidate any and all accommodations for religious 
organizations, as long as the reviewing court holds true to Lemon’s plain language.  
It is hard to conceive of how a law exempting a group would not be perceived as 
providing a benefit to that group and thus its purpose was to benefit them.   
Changing the “secular purpose” prong of Lemon to instead inquire whether 
the purpose of an accommodation was to allow religious organizations to be 
religious does not mean that any and all accommodations will suddenly become 
permissible.  At some point, government accommodations of religion or religious 
practice will become the equivalent of promoting religion, in general, or a religion, 
in particular.  The line, therefore, is that accommodations from general laws for 
                                                 
185 “Separtionism, at its most basic level, presumes that government should, at times, must, treat 
religion distinctively.” Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the 
Imbalance between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1126 (2002).   
 
186 The Court in Amos found that the Title VII exemption did have a secular purpose – keeping 
government out of religious organization’s affairs.  But that same argument could be made for not 
applying any laws to religious organizations.  This, of course, would go too far.  The Establishment 




religious groups must be based on the need to not prejudice religious practice.187  For 
example, by allowing a church to decide who spreads their message, the government 
accommodation permits the religion to do what it is designed to do – be religious.  
On the other hand, giving a religious magazine a tax credit that is not available to 
other magazines merely gives the religious publisher a financial advantage not 
enjoyed by his secular competitors.  Where the “impact [of neutral laws] on religious 
belief is minimal,”188 accommodation looks more like favoritism towards religion 
than “free[ing religious organizations] from state interference.”189     
 With respect to the conduct-based and ministerial exemptions from 
employment-discrimination laws, a religion’s tenets may require an employee to be a 
member in good standing,190 follow church standards for daily life,191 or change 
personal characteristics, traits, or behaviors to conform to religious doctrine.192  A 
religion’s official position on morality does not have to be popular or generally 
accepted within the community for First Amendment protections to apply.193  While 
                                                                                                                                          
 
187 Government should provide “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from 
secular control or manipulation – in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state 
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 
188 EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982). 
   
189 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952). 
 
190 Good standing may be defined as attending church regularly. 
 
191 Amos dealt with a janitor in a Mormon facility that had not earned his “temple recommend.”  
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). This certification from the Mormon Church requires adherence to “the 
Church’s standards in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, 
tea, alcohol, and tobacco.”  Id. at 330 n.4. 
 
192 This may include requiring individuals to conceal their sexual preference or not engage in non-
marital sex.   
 
193 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) 
("Religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others to merit 
First Amendment protection").  “It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular 
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other members of the community may not agree with the religious organization’s 
moral code and may even abhor what they perceive as intolerance, the fact remains 
that it is for the church to decide what employees will best convey the religion’s 
message.  To allow the community, through government regulation, to control a 
church’s message is the equivalent of the government dictating what that message is.  
While commentators can and do disagree about the proper meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, all would agree that a national church is, at minimum, 
prohibited by the Clause. 
 Second, accommodations must be neutral among religions to ensure that 
government is not favoring one religion over another.194  In Board of Education of 
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the Supreme Court found that drawing 
a school district to exclusively include one particular religious enclave was 
unconstitutional.195  One of the Court’s chief concerns was that it would be 
impossible for the Court to ensure that other religious groups would get the same 
kind of accommodation.196  In a similar vein, government cannot condition a 
religious accommodation on adherence to any particular religion.  For example, this 
element of the new accommodations test would be violated if only adherents of 
some, but not all, faiths could qualify for the accommodation. 
Some commentators contend that releasing religious organizations from 
governmental burdens imposed on non-religious groups violates the Establishment 
                                                                                                                                          
beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.” 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990). 
 
194  “[E]venhanded neutrality can be viewed as advancing equality values by removing barriers to 
religious participation in generally available programs.  Neutrality theory provides that individuals 
and organizations should not be disabled from participating in government benefits programs simply 
because of their religious character and states its goal as minimizing government influences on private 
religious choices.”  Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the 
Imbalance between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 1132 (2002). 
 
195 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994). 
 




Clause because it non-neutrally provides a benefit to religion.197  Allowing religious 
schools to discriminate in employment while not allowing non-religious schools the 
same latitude may appear non-neutral at first.  But this argument ignores the fact that 
government must allow religion to be religious or it runs the risk of appearing to 
disfavor religion relative to non-religion.  By not providing accommodations for 
religious activities, government would be discriminating against religion.198  The 
latitude to choose the leaders of their faith and to employ only those who share the 
religion’s beliefs and conduct their lives based on the religion’s tenets gives religious 
organizations the same control that non-religious organizations have.  Government 
can remove burdens for religious groups, so long as that same burden is removed for 
all religions and is not designed to benefit one religion over another.199   
 Establishment Clause jurisprudence has long been concerned with whether 
government action acts as an improper imprimatur for religious activity.  The third 
element of the new test – no perceived endorsement – echoes this tradition.  
Accommodations meeting the first two prongs of the new accommodations test, 
however, will generally not be viewed as government endorsements.200 
                                                 
197 Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary 
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991).   
 
198 Carl H. Esbeck believes that the neutrality rule means “that the government cannot intentionally 
discriminate against religion.”  Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint 




200  “A generally available exemption program, with a potentially unlimited number of participants, is 
unlikely to be perceived as favoring religion or to create religious dissension or competition.  On the 
contrary, [a tax] exception will likely lead to greater autonomy and independence of religious entities, 
thus ensuring greater separation of the two spheres.” Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential 
Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance between Neutrality and Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111, 
1134 (2002).   
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 While accommodations only provide benefits to religious organizations,201 
“government itself” is not promoting or advancing religion by providing an 
exemption.202  Rather, the accommodation merely removes an impediment to private 
religious activity.203  In effect, by providing the accommodation, government is only 
“endors[ing] ... free exercise of religion and not ... a particular religion or even ... 
religion in general.”204  For example, Justice O’Connor’s Amos concurrence found 
that although the Title VII exemption had a non-secular purpose, it met the strictures 
of the Establishment Clause because the “objective observer [would] perceive the 
Government action [the Title VII exemption] as an accommodation of the exercise of 
religion rather than as a Government endorsement of religion.”205  
 Allowing religious organizations to discriminate in employment based on 
conduct or by invoking the ministerial exception206 cannot be viewed by an objective 
observer as a government endorsement of religion because such accommodations are 
merely removing government-imposed burdens so that organizations may spread 
their message.  For conduct, all private employers, not just religious ones, may 
discriminate on the basis of an employee’s viewpoint.  By exempting religious 
organizations from local anti-discrimination laws, government would be providing 
religious schools with “permission” to discriminate while not condoning that 
                                                 
201 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 333 (1987).  The lower court found that the exemption granted religious organizations 
“an exclusive authorization to engage in conduct which can directly and immediately advance 
religious tenets and practices.”  Id. (quoting lower court’s opinion). 
 
202 Id. at 337 (italics in original). “A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to 




204 Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 (W.D. Mich. 2002). 
 
205 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 348-49 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
206 See supra Part I for discussion of employment discrimination based on conduct, the Title VII 




discrimination.  The legislature would merely be acknowledging that religion holds a 
special place in our constitutional framework and that certain narrowly-tailored 
accommodations act by ensuring that religious institutions can continue to spread the 
message unhindered by government regulations.  The school, not the state, 
discriminates against potential and current employees.  In the case of religion 
teachers or teachers of subjects basked in religion,207 that discrimination is rooted in 
the concern that only religious adherents can properly convey the church’s message.  
Without the ministerial exception, government would be too heavily involved in 
internal church affairs giving rise to the fear that government would be speaking for 
religion itself.  Such accommodations can no more be perceived as a government 
endorsement of religious practice than having the government issue a parade permit 
to a neo-Nazi group could be seen as a government endorsement of their racist 
politics. 
 Lastly, any accommodation must avoid entanglement between government 
and religion.  In most cases, avoiding such entanglement may be the 
accommodation’s very purpose.  For example, in Amos, the Court found that the 
Title VII exemption’s purpose was to avoid entanglement between religious 
organizations and employment-related government agencies.208  Not all 
entanglement, however, rises to the level of “excessive entanglement” identified in 
the Lemon test.  While an accommodation that relieves excessive entanglement may 
be constitutionally required by the Establishment Clause, one that merely alleviates 
government from monitoring a religious organization’s activities may be 
permissible, but not mandated under the Clause.  That is, an accommodation that is 
                                                 
207 “Numerous courts have held that the term ‘religious institution,’ in [the context of the ministerial 
exception] can include religiously affiliated schools, hospitals, and corporations.”  Shaliehsabou v. 
Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 
208 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
336 (1987). 
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not designed to reduce entanglement looks more like favoritism towards religion 
than government relieving burdens.209 
 The secular purpose stated in Amos was to keep government from interfering 
in the religious decision making inherent in hiring and firing decisions.210  
Exemptions from antidiscrimination laws for religious schools alleviate the need for 
government officials and courts to determine what qualifies as an “important” job 
qualification for the religious school’s employees.  For example, a Catholic school 
wanting to hire only devout Catholic teachers for religion classes could, without the 
ministerial exemption or the Title VII provision, be forced to hire an atheist.  If the 
school refused to hire the otherwise qualified teacher, the applicant could claim 
discrimination and file suit against the church.211  The school would be forced to 
justify its hiring decision in court and a judge would have to determine if belief in 
God was a bona fide occupational qualification for the position.  This process would 
necessarily involve government inspection of all the papers, meetings, and decisions 
of the hiring personnel.  Additionally, the court would have to decide just how 
religious religion teachers must be.212  These types of decisions are better left to the 
religious organizations themselves because government involvement with religion 
carries too much risk of either having religion co-opt government to do its bidding or 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
  
210 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
335-36 (1987).  “This does not mean that the law’s purpose must be unrelated to religion – that would 
amount to a requirement ‘that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups’. . . 
Lemon’s ‘purpose’ requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker . . . from 
abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious 
matters.”  Id. at 335.   
 
211 See id. at 336.  The Court pointed out that the “[f]ear of potential liability might affect the way [a 
religious] organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission” without the Title VII 
exemption applying to both secular and religious employees.  Id.  
 
212 “[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, 




government dictating religion.213  To preserve both the secular and the religious 
realm, government must remain outside religious decisionmaking.214   
   
                                                 
213 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT AND A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 215, 247-51(Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).  Government should avoid 
investigating employment-discrimination claims where it would require government interpretation of 
religious canons or when the inquiry would intrude on internal church governance, both of which 
could be inherently coercive.  See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 
214 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
339 (1987).  “[T]he statute effectuates a more complete separation of [church and state] and avoids 
the kind of intrusive inquiry” that would be required absent the exemption.  Id. 
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PART III: DOES GOVERNMENT MONEY CHANGE THE OUTCOME? 
 
Where they exist, voucher programs have been popular among participants215 
and have shown success in improving test scores and educational opportunities.216  
Approximately 55,000 students217 participate in voucher programs in Arizona,218 
Florida,219 Georgia,220 Ohio, Utah,221 Wisconsin,222 and the District of Columbia.223 
And it is likely that participation numbers will only increase as state budgets for 
vouchers rise and information about the programs spread.224  Most of the students in 
                                                 
215 Washington Scholarship Fund, Latest Report form Georgetown University Shows Strong Support 
for D.C. Scholarship Program, Dec. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonscholarshipfund.org/news/news/pr_12_20_07.html.  The Georgetown study 
found that parents had an “increased focus on and pride in their children’s academic development.  
The scholarship families – who are all low-income and have become informed and savvy ‘consumers’ 
of educational options – report that their children are thriving academically and socially in the schools 
of their choice.” 
 
216 JAY P. GREENE, EDUCATION MYTHS : WHAT SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WANT YOU TO BELIEVE 
ABOUT OUR SCHOOLS, AND WHY IT ISN'T SO 151 (2005). 
 
217 Dan Lips, School Choice: Policy Developments and National Participation Estimates in 2007-
2008, Heritage Foundation Backgrounds No. 2102 (Jan. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/upload/bg_2102.pdf . 
 
218 Limited to special needs students and children in foster care. 
 
219 Limited to special needs students. 
 
220 Limited to special needs students. 
 
221 Limited to disabled students. 
 
222 Limited to economically disadvantaged children in Milwaukee. 
 
223 Limited to economically disadvantaged children. 
 
224 Milwaukee’s program began in 1990 with just 337 students but has expanded to over 17,500 
participating students in 2007.  Dan Lips, School Choice: Policy Developments and National 
Participation Estimates in 2007-2008, Heritage Foundation Backgrounds No. 2102 (Jan. 31, 2008), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/upload/bg_2102.pdf (citing Wisconsin 
Department of Public Instruction, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: Facts and Figures for 2007-
2008 (Nov. 2007), available at http://dpi.state.wi.us/sms/doc/mpc07fnf.doc; School Choice 
Wisconsin, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/facts/index.dfm?fl_id=1.  In D.C., the program was so popular that 
four students applied for every voucher available. Washington Scholarship Fund, Latest Report form 
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the programs attend religious schools,225 which is not surprising given that most of 
the schools participating are parochial. 
While exemptions from employment antidiscrimination laws for religious 
schools do not violate the Establishment Clause, what if the school participates in a 
publicly funded voucher program?  How does government involvement change the 
analysis?  Are employment accommodations for religious schools participating in the 
program226 still permissible, or do they penetrate the “wall of separation between 
church and state”?227  To answer this question, we must apply the accommodations 
methodology developed in Part II.     
The first element of the new accommodations test asks whether the purpose 
of the accommodation is to allow religious organizations to act in a manner 
consistent with their religious dictates.  In other words, does permitting religious 
voucher schools to discriminate based on conduct, religion, or for ministerial 
                                                                                                                                          
Georgetown University Shows Strong Support for D.C. Scholarship Program, Dec. 20, 2007, 
available at http://www.washingtonscholarshipfund.org/news/news/pr_12_20_07.html.   
 
225 For example, for the 2001-2002 school year, 76.2% of students in the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program attended private religious schools and 70 of the 104 schools participating in the program 
were religious institutions.  Howard L. Fuller & Deborah Greiveldinger, The Impact of School Choice 
on Racial Integration in Milwaukee Private Schools, American Education Reform Council 6 (August 
2002), available at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/data/research/integ0802.pdf.  In Florida, 62% of 
the schools participating in the John M. McKay Scholarship Program for Students with Disabilities 
Program are religious schools.  Florida Department of Education Office of Independent Education and 
Parental Choice, John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, available at 
http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/information/McKay/files/Fast_Facts_McKay.pdf. 
 
226 Participating in a voucher program would not transform a school into a state actor for purposes of 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis.  See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (finding 
that a private school that received 99% of its funding from the state was not a state actor for purposes 
of a civil-rights claim by the school’s employees where the state exhibited no “encouragement” for 
the school’s practices of suppressing speech by its employees); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 
1011-12 (1982); Lown v. Salvation Army, 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  See also 
Brent Shelley, The Impact of School Vouchers on Employment Law: State Regulatory Interference 
with Private Religious Schools, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 129, 149-50 (2005/2006).  The issue remains 
whether government-funded vouchers would invalidate any government-provided accommodations, 
see infra Part III, and whether government could condition participation in government –funded 
voucher programs on relinquishment of government-provided accommodations, see infra Part V. 
 
227 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Nehemiah Dodge, et al., Danbury 
Baptist Association in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802). 
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positions allow religions to be religious?  Furthermore, would the failure to allow 
these types of discrimination create a major or a minor impediment to religious 
activity?  Government disallowance of these types of discrimination, especially 
based on conduct or with respect to ministerial positions, would impose significant 
burdens on religious activity.  State control over who speaks for a church interferes 
at a fundamental level with the religious message.  In the context of a religious 
school, this is especially true for teachers of religiously-based subjects.   
The next element asks whether the accommodation is applied neutrally 
among religions.  Every voucher program now in existence is open to schools of all 
religious persuasions and any religion can take advantage of the employment-law 
exemptions.228  Of course, the exemption would be used most fervently by those 
religions that condemn out-of-wedlock intercourse and homosexuality, and who are 
generally less tolerant of practices and views that differ from their own.229  It is 
important to note, however, that that outcome results from the various religions’ 
views rather than any government favoritism. 
The third element of the new accommodations test asks whether exempting 
religious schools participating in voucher programs from antidiscrimination laws 
helps to avoid excessive entanglement between church and state.  While a religious 
school’s participation in a voucher program may mean increased state involvement 
in the school’s educational decisions,230 this involvement does not extend to 
                                                                                                                                          
 
228 See supra notes 6-12.  Some of the programs, such as those in Ohio, prohibit schools from teaching 
intolerance or hate.  
 
229 It is not surprising that groups with minority views about culture and morality are the very ones 
who choose to open private parochial schools in the first place.  Their minority views, contrasted with 
more the more generically Protestant or areligious public schools, may have been the impetus for 
creating their own schools.  
 
230 See, e.g., Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 648-49 
(1980) (upholding against an Establishment Clause challenge a New York statute that authorized 
reimbursement for private schools’ costs of administering standardized tests mandated by the state); 
see Brent Shelley, The Impact of School Vouchers on Employment Law: State Regulatory Interference 




employment decisions.  For example, as a condition of participation, the state or 
locality may require that schools meet certain educational requirements to remain in 
the voucher program.231  This, however, does not keep religion from being religious, 
as such requirements would not hinder the religious mission of the schools.  The 
government’s involvement is limited to ensuring that the schools are meeting the 
criteria to participate in the program.232  Conversely, state monitoring and 
involvement in employment decisions233 would necessarily require the state to assess 
whether adherence to the religion or its tenets was a bona fide occupational 
qualification for a position.234  Such an inquiry would include government 
determinations about how much weight various church dictates deserve and how 
important adherence to church doctrine is to each position.  More entanglement 
between church and state is difficult to imagine. 
The most important and relevant issue, though, for whether government 
funding combined with antidiscrimination law exemptions for religious schools 
violates the Establishment Clause is the new accommodations test’s fourth and final 
element: could the combination reasonably be viewed as a government endorsement 
                                                 
231 The government has to ensure that schools in the voucher program perform better than the failing 
public schools that generated the need for the voucher program in the first place. 
 
232 See supra notes 6-12.  Utah’s statute specifically states that the government’s regulatory authority 
is limited to what is necessary to ensure that the school is meeting eligibility criteria. 
 
233 See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 948 (3d Cir. 1991).  “Application of Title VII’s prohibition 
against religious discrimination to the Parish’s decision would also be suspect because it arguably 
would create excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of the establishment 
clause.” Id. 
 
234 Without this exemption, religious organizations would be forced to attempt to redefine the Title 
VII exemption to permit discrimination against those who may be a member of the organization’s 
faith but who do not conduct themselves in a manner consistent with religious tenets.  Cf. Pedreira v. 
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (finding that 
conduct-based discrimination not prohibited by statute could not be characterized as prohibited 
religious discrimination).  The Establishment Clause test for accommodations developed in Part II is 
more narrowly focused than such a broad interpretation of Title VII.  The accommodations test only 
includes those characteristics that would be central to the religious practice and would not allow a 
general exemption from all antidiscrimination laws to any church that could redefine what being a 
member of its own religion was. 
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of either religion or discrimination committed by religious schools?  The remainder 
of this Part considers this question with respect to conduct-based discrimination, 
religious discrimination, and the ministerial exception and ends with a discussion of 
possible limitations generated by participation in a government-funded program.   
 
SECTION III.A: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND ENDORSEMENT  
 
 While there is considerable debate about the original meaning of the 
Establishment Clause,235 most commentators agree that government cannot officially 
create or endorse any particular religion or religion in general.  Even when 
governmental action does not intentionally endorse, though, the Establishment 
Clause would be violated if a reasonable observer perceived such an endorsement.  
The reasoning behind this rule lies in whether adherents to non-favored faiths or 
atheists would feel ostracized from government favor.  “Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community.”236  For religious schools in voucher 
programs, whether exemptions for conduct-based discrimination, the ministerial 
exception, and religious affiliation discrimination equate to government endorsement 
as viewed by the reasonable observer is key.   
 But reasonableness is a malleable standard.  Courts must consider all the facts 
that the reasonable observer would view.  Even though school voucher programs act 
through the independent, private decisions of parents, a reasonable person could, at 
the margins, see taxpayer dollars going to religious schools that discriminate as 
inching towards endorsement.  To maintain a constitutional balance, 
accommodations must be crafted to be tighter and more narrowly tailored so as to 
                                                 
235 See supra note 106 and notes 147-153 and accompanying text. 
 




protect against the appearance of endorsement.  Where that balance lies differs 
among conduct-based discrimination, discrimination based on religious affiliation, 
and employment decisions concerning ministerial employees.     
 
III.A.1: Conduct-Based Discrimination 
 
As mentioned earlier, discrimination based on unmarried sexual intercourse 
and homosexuality237 may run afoul of federal, state, or local antidiscrimination 
laws.  Federal law prohibits pregnancy discrimination,238 and of the locales currently 
with school-voucher programs, Wisconsin,239 the District of Columbia,240 and 
several localities in Arizona,241 Florida,242 Georgia,243 Ohio,244 and Utah245 prohibit 
                                                 
237 See supra Section I.A. 
 
238 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2008). 
 
239 WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31 – 111.36 (2006). 
 
240 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (2007). 
 
241 Local statutes in Phoenix and Tucson prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  Human Rights Campaign, WorkNet Employer Database, at 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search_employers.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 
242 Local statutes in Broward County, Miami-Dade County, Monroe County, Palm Beach County, and 
the cities of Gainesville, Key West, Miami Beach, Orlando, Sarasota, St. Petersburg, Tampa, and 
West Palm Beach prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Human Rights 
Campaign, WorkNet Employer Database, at 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search_employers.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 
243 Local statutes in DeKalb County and the cities of Atlanta and Decatur prohibit employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Human Rights Campaign, WorkNet Employer Database, 
at http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search_employers.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 
244 Local statutes in Athens, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Toledo, and Yellow Springs prohibit 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Human Rights Campaign, WorkNet 
Employer Database, at http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search_employers.htm (last visited Feb. 
26, 2008). 
 
245 Local statutes in Salt Lake City prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
Human Rights Campaign, WorkNet Employer Database, at 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/search_employers.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.  These statutes may conflict directly with 
a religious school’s employment practices.246  Can allowing an exemption for 
conduct-based discrimination by religious schools in voucher programs reasonably 
be viewed as government endorsement of religion or religious practice? 
The government is not promoting religion by exempting religious schools 
from federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws, it is merely “getting out of the 
way” for the religious school to do what it was designed to do – teach children under 
the tenets of the religion.247  While some amount of taxpayer money could end up at 
a religious school that discriminates, parents – not the government – make that 
happen.248  Additionally, government is not dictating church actions or determining 
church tenets.  The church school, not the government, determines what church 
tenets warrant discrimination against individuals whose conduct contradicts church 
tenets.  The combination of government absence from religious decision-making and 
the individual choices of parents to apply vouchers towards religious school tuition 
shield conduct-based exemptions from the appearance of governmental endorsement. 
 
III.A.2: The Title VII Exemption for Religious Affiliation Discrimination 
 
Title VII permits discrimination by religious organizations based on religious 
affiliation, as we have seen earlier.249  In Amos,250 the Supreme Court held that this 
                                                 
246 Institutions that are not explicitly religious may be affected by these statutes, as well.  Freedom of 
association grounds, however, may allow non-religious organizations whose code of conduct opposes 
homosexuality to discriminate in employment. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 
(2000).  Individuals, however, are not exempt.  See Hyman v. Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 544 
(W.D. Kent. 2001). 
 
247 In contrast, applying Title VII to a religious publishing house did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause because “the impact on religious belief was minimal and the interest in equal employment 
opportunity was high.”  EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
 
248 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
 




exemption for religious affiliation does not violate the Establishment Clause.  That 
opinion, however, did not apply the accommodations analysis or address the impact 
of government-derived funding.  Instead, it used a contorted Lemon test.  Would a 
religious school’s participation in a voucher program change the result? 
The addition of taxpayer funding to the Title VII exemption means that the 
accommodation must be more narrowly tailored to protect against any perceived 
government endorsement.  The Title VII exemption for religious affiliation is a rule 
acting as a proxy for religious adherence.  But, like other rules, the exemption is both 
over- and under-inclusive.251  For example, the exemption would shield a Catholic 
church that fired a non-Catholic employee who had conducted his daily life as a 
“good” Catholic would.  In contrast, the church could not legally fire a Catholic 
employee who actively eschews the Church’s teachings, at least not based solely on 
the Title VII exemption.  When the exemption stood on its own,252 these problems 
were of less concern because a reasonable observer would view the exemption as 
government getting out of the way for religious organizations to be religious.  
Government funding of religious-school tuition clouds that message.  As a result, 
courts may rule that Title VII exemption’s sweep is too broad to survive an 
Establishment Clause challenge.   
 
Section III.A.3: The Ministerial Exception 
 
Unlike the Title VII exemption, it is highly unlikely that any court would 
ever hold that the ministerial exception, regardless of the presence of government 
money, amounted to a governmental endorsement of religion.  The ministerial 
exception is the fundamental building block for a church independent from the 
                                                                                                                                          
250 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 
251 See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. 
Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1580 (D. Colo. 1997).  
 
252 See Part II.B.2. 
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state253 and is evidence of the government’s hands-off approach.  The exception 
guarantees that government will remain uninvolved in the key employment decisions 
of religious schools.  Government is neither hiring the teachers nor dictating the 
religious lesson plan.   
Indeed, government control over a religious school’s key hires or the creation 
of its lesson plan would be the very example of an Establishment Clause violation.  
More than mere entanglement would be involved – essentially government would 
control church speech.  Without the ministerial exception, one can imagine a 
scenario where the government would need to determine the qualifications of 
religion teachers.  This would put the government in the position of determining – or  
at least overseeing – which teachers best conveyed the religious message and, thus, 
altering that message.254  If anything, the removal of the ministerial exception would 
make it more likely that the reasonable observer would perceive government 
endorsement of religion than if the exception remains in place.     
 
SECTION III.B:  LIMITATIONS ON ANTIDISCRIMINATION EXEMPTIONS 
 
While it does not appear that permitting exemptions for religious schools 
participating in government-funded voucher programs suggests an endorsement of 
religion, direct state funding of teacher salaries may.  In Dodge v. Salvation Army,255 
a religious employer tried to fire a Wiccan employee because of her religion.256  The 
                                                 
253 See Part IV. 
 
254 See, e.g., Miller v. Bay View United Methodist, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (E.D. Wis. 2001).  The 
“state may no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal 
content.”  Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese, 233 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (2002) (quoting 
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 
255 Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. S88-0353(R), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4797 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 
1989). 
 




position was paid for directly with government funds.257  The court found that even 
though the religious organization was entitled to the Title VII exemption, they could 
not discriminate against this particular employee.258  The religious employer, 
however, could continue to discriminate based on religion with respect to other 
employees.259   
There are several problems with the Dodge opinion.  First, other courts have 
held that religious organizations cannot waive their Title VII exemption.260  Second, 
Dodge applied a stricter, more separationist version of the Lemon test than the 
Supreme Court currently adheres to.261  For all its flaws, this Article assumes Dodge  
is still good law.   
The key difference between the facts in Dodge and those contemplated by 
this Article lies in the independent decision-making of parents.  In all existing 
school-voucher programs, government does not directly pay for teacher salaries.  
Instead, government funds are either sent directly to students or applied to tuition 
bills on their behalf.  Government makes no decision about what school receives the 
funds or how that school uses them.  Any government money that ends up in a 
religious school’s coffers arrives there only through the independent decisions of 
individuals.262  The fact that parents, not the government, decide which school the 
voucher goes to dramatically lessens the chances that a reasonable observer would 
view the combination of the Title VII exemption and participation in a voucher 
program as a government endorsement of religion. 
 
                                                 
257 Dodge, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4797, at *9. 
 
258 Dodge, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4797, at *13. 
 
259 Dodge, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4797, at *13. 
 
260 See Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 (D. Iowa 
2006); Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation, 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 
261 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
262 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002). 
March 26, 2008 
 
54 
PART IV: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, EMPLOYMENT 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS, AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS IN SCHOOL 
VOUCHER PROGRAMS 
 
 What the Establishment Clause permits, the Free Exercise Clause does not 
necessarily mandate.  As the Court recently stated, there is “play in the joints” 
between the two Clauses.263  State and local governments have some latitude to 
regulate the secular activities of religious organizations, including private religious 
schools.264  But the Free Exercise Clause prohibits regulations that would infringe 
too much on religious activities.265    
 The proper mix of government accommodation of religion and the 
application of generally applicable laws has confounded the Court in Free Exercise 
cases.  Early cases required accommodation for religious practice if government 
regulation created a substantial burden and the regulation did not pass strict 
scrutiny.266  Later, though, this inquiry changed to deny court-made exemptions from 
generally applicable laws, regardless of the burden that those laws imposed on 
religious practice.267  In so doing, the Court recognized that while our Constitution 
provides a special place for religious exercise that is not afforded to other personal 
                                                                                                                                          
 
263 See e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 
(2005). 
 
264 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
 
265 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).  See also Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish 
the expression of religious doctrine it believes to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of 
religious views or religious status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over 
religious authority or dogma.” (citations omitted)). 
 
266 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987). 
 
267 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).  One commentator referred to this move 
as “gutting the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantor of religious liberty.”  Nadine Strossen, Religion 
and the Constitution: A Libertarian Perspective, 2005-06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7, 27 (2005/2006).  
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preferences, the government has an interest in applying general laws even when they 
may adversely affect religion.268  Free Exercise cases, therefore, concern where the 
line between permissible accommodation and government favoritism lies.269   
 This Part asks whether the Free Exercise Clause prohibits state and local 
governments from regulating the relationship between religious schools and their 
employees.270  Section IV.A argues that there are two types of Free Exercise cases 
involving generally applicable laws: those concerning internal church affairs and 
those that do not.  This Section concludes that because the ministerial exception 
affects internal church affairs, any restriction prohibiting religious organizations 
from using it would violate the Free Exercise Clause.  Section IV.B. addresses 
whether religious schools have a constitutional right to discriminate based on 
conduct.  Lastly, Section IV.B. considers whether the Title VII exemption is 
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.   
   
SECTION IV.A: TWO TYPES OF FREE EXERCISE CASES AND THE MINISTERIAL 
EXCEPTION 
  
                                                 
 
268 See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. 
REV. 173 (2002). “[A] Free Exercise Clause challenge is more difficult to sustain in that it requires a 
showing of governmental coercion. . . .” Id. at 343.  
 
269 “Typically, a Free Exercise Clause challenge is asserted against a facially neutral law on the 
ground that (1) the law compels people to do something that their religion forbids, or prohibits people 
from doing something that their religion requires, or (2) compliance with the requirements of the law 
imposes a burden on a person because of that person’s adherence to religious beliefs, or (3) the law 
interferes with the operations of a religious organization.”  Id. at 344. 
 
270 “The limits of … accommodation by government are not ‘coextensive with the noninterference 
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.’” Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, 224 F.3d 
283, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)).   
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 In most of its modern history, the dominant case in the Supreme Court’s Free 
Exercise jurisprudence was Sherbert v. Verner.271  In that case, South Carolina 
denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to accept 
work that included Saturday shifts.272  The state courts had sided with the state 
employment commission.  In overturning the denial of benefits, the Supreme Court 
held that infringements on Free Exercise must survive strict scrutiny, i.e., the 
government must prove both a compelling state interest and that its regulation is 
narrowly tailored.273   
Sherbert reigned until 1990 when the Supreme Court fundamentally altered 
Free Exercise jurisprudence in Employment Division v. Smith.274  As in Sherbert, the 
plaintiffs were denied unemployment benefits due to their religious practices.  They 
had been fired from their jobs for disobeying a law criminalizing peyote use.275  The 
Oregon Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that the denial of benefits 
violated the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights.  In reversing, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
271 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 
272 Saturday is the Sabbath for Seventh-Day Adventists.  Id. at 399. 
 
273 Id. at 406-08. 
 
274 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Following Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) in an effort to restore the pre-Smith Sherbert strict-scrutiny test for statutes and regulations 
that substantially burdened religious practice.  The Court struck the portions of RFRA that applied to 
state laws in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997).  Congress then passed the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) based on its Commerce Clause and Spending 
Clause powers.  The reach of the RLUIPA has not been fully litigated, although the Court has held 
that the sections concerning prison inmates do not violate the Establishment Clause.  Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).  If RLUIPA , RFRA (which would apply to the District of 
Columbia), and state-RFRAs have re-established a Sherbert-like standard of review, religious schools 
have a fairly strong case for arguing that exemptions from antidiscrimination laws are mandated since 
the laws would have to pass a strict-scrutiny analysis.  See Eugene Volokh, Looking Backward, 
Looking Forward: The Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, Freedom of 
Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1954-65 (2006).  If, 
however, RLUIPA, RFRA, and state-RFRAs are not available, the case must be made under the less 
beneficial standard of Smith.  The remainder of this Article assumes the worst from the perspective of 
religious schools: Smith reigns. 
 




reverted to its pre-Sherbert by saying test that “generally applicable, religion-neutral 
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest.”276   
In the wake of Smith, generally applicable laws will usually survive Free 
Exercise challenges.277  States enact these laws, within their police power, to curtail 
certain activities, but the laws are not designed to target a particular religious 
practice.278  A statute, however, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause when it is 
generally applicable279 and otherwise valid, does not have burdening religion as its 
object,280 only has an incidental effect on religious practices,281 and does not 
implicate other constitutional rights.282   
 Following Smith, it was unclear whether the ministerial exception survived.  
Lower courts have filled the void by unanimously holding that Smith does not apply 
                                                 
276 See id. at 886 n.3. 
 
277 Id. at 879.  “The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”  Id.  In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court held that in addition to being generally applicable, 
a valid statute must also be facially neutral.  In other words, the government action cannot target 
religious activity. 
 
278 Smith suggests that a law designed to punish religious organizations would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause. Id. at 882.  While noting that the Court has not directly considered such a case, the 
Smith majority stated “that a State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise of religion’ if it sought to 
ban [religious] acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only 
because of the religious belief that they display.” Id. at 887.   
 
279 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). 
 
280 Laws cannot have the “unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices.”  Id. at 
529.     
 
281 Cf. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993). 
 
282 “[T]he First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously 
motivated action [which] involve[s] not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause 
in conjunction with other constitutional protections. . . .”  Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 881 (1990).  These additional constitutional protections include, inter alia, freedoms of speech 
and press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and parent’s rights to direct the 
education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
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to internal church affairs.283 In EEOC v. Catholic University of America,284 for 
example, the D.C. Circuit held that there are two strands of Free Exercise analysis.  
First, statutes that “interfere[e] with a believer’s ability to observe the commands or 
practices of his faith” are subject to Smith.285  In contrast, though, statutes that would 
“encroach[] on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs”286 fall outside of 
Smith and must survive strict scrutiny.  A church, not an individual, can be relieved 
of laws of general applicability.287   
Prohibiting the ministerial exception violates the Free Exercise Clause 
because government would be interfering with a religious organization’s internal 
affairs.288  Such a law would have more than an incidental effect on religious 
practices.289  Religious education is a central purpose of many religious 
organizations and prohibiting them from discriminating in the hiring of ministerial 
                                                                                                                                          
 
283 See, e.g., Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 
343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999).  The internal church affair doctrine pre-dates Smith.  In Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), the Supreme Court refused to 
resolve an internal church dispute on Free Exercise grounds.  But, the Court has never ruled directly 
on the ministerial exception.  Instead, lower courts have all held that the exception, as part of the 
internal church affairs doctrine, survives Smith.   
  
284 EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 
285 Id. at 460. 
 
286 Id.  
 
287 “The ministerial exception is not invoked to protect the freedom of an individual to observe a 
particular command or practice of his church.  Rather it is designed to protect the freedom of the 
church to select those who will carry out its religious mission.” EEOC v. Catholic University of 
America, 83 F. 3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. 
Supp. 2d 528, 537-38 (W.D. Kent. 2001) (finding that a local civil rights code exempted religious 
organizations, but not religious individuals, for some kinds of employment discrimination).  
 
288 “[C]hurches have a constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions free of 
government interference.” Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right of Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 
(1981). 
 




employees would hinder their ability to ensure that the school’s religion teachers 
adhered to the religion’s tenets.  This would disrupt the ability of religious 
organizations to provide a religious education to both its voucher and non-voucher 
students.  Additionally, revocation of the ministerial exception would force courts to 
evaluate religious doctrine in determining whether an applicant was qualified for the 
ministerial position, a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.290  As such, the 
Free Exercise Clause gives religious organizations the constitutional right to 
discriminate in the employment decisions they make regarding ministerial 
employees, including teachers of religious subjects.   
 
SECTION IV.B. LOCAL CIVIL RIGHTS CODES, THE TITLE VII EXEMPTION, AND THE 
SMITH-HYBRID TEST 
 
 Non-ministerial employees would fall outside the internal church affairs 
doctrine and, therefore, be subject to a Smith analysis.  Since antidiscrimination laws 
are generally applicable and are not targeted at religious practice, their enforcement 
against religious schools, at first blush, appears constitutional.  Therefore, applying 
these statutes to religious schools does not seem to violate the Free Exercise Clause.       
 But if Congress attempted to curtail a religious school’s ability to 
discriminate by rescinding the Title VII exemption, or if state and local governments 
sought to enforce civil rights codes that prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, more than just Free Exercise is involved – other fundamental rights may 
be implicated.291  To reconcile previous Free Exercise jurisprudence with the new 
Smith rule, the Court noted an exception: when Free Exercise and another 
constitutional right are simultaneously violated by a generally applicable, neutral 
                                                 
290 See supra pp. 40-41. 
 
291 The Smith court recognized that some fundamental rights, such as the freedom to direct the 
education of one’s children and freedom of speech, were likely candidates for Smith-Hybrid cases.  
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 
(1990). 
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law, the Sherbert standard applies.292  Commentators refer to these types of cases as 
“Smith-Hybrid” cases.293 
 The state clearly has an interest in ending employment discrimination. 294   
But that goal must be weighed against the burden placed on religious practice.  There 
are two constitutional rights that be may implicated in applying antidiscrimination 
laws to non-ministerial employees of a religious school: the freedom of expressive 
association and the right of parents to direct their child’s education.  If a court 
concludes that either right is implicated along with the Free Exercise Clause, the 
state’s burden dramatically increases.   
 
Section IV.B.1.  Free Exercise and Conduct-Based Discrimination 
 
 State and local governments’ civil-rights codes often abut the beliefs and 
practices of religious organizations.  For example, laws that forbid discrimination 
based on sexual orientation conflict with the tenets of several major religions.295  Do 
religious organizations and their schools have a constitutional right to avoid the 
reach of these laws?   
 In the context of discussing religious organizations, the constitutional right 
that would provide the most obvious source of cover would be the Free Exercise 
                                                                                                                                          
 
292 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-84 (1990).  “The only instances where a 
neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were 
cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake.”  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
513-514 (1997). 
 
293 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990); see also Watchtower Bible and 
Tract Soc’y of New York v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160 n.8 (2002).  For a summary of the 
debate regarding Smith-Hybrid cases, see Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of 
the Century, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 187, 196 (2001).   
 
294 See, e.g., Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 475, 496-98 (2002); 
Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by 
Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979). 
 




Clause.  But, following the Court’s opinion in Smith, there is little chance that a 
stand-alone Free Exercise would succeed when challenging a state or local 
prohibition on employment discrimination.296  In most cases, state and local 
antidiscrimination laws are neutral, generally applicable, and do not target 
religion.297  Because the statute treats religious employers in the same way as other 
employers who may have their own belief structures, it is valid even if the effect on 
religion is not insubstantial.  To succeed, religious schools must combine their Free 
Exercise concerns with infringement of another fundamental right to fall within the 
Smith-Hybrid carve-out.298  The combination of the two rights will subject the 
government regulation to a strict-scrutiny analysis and, thus, render it less likely to 
be found constitutional.   
 The strongest constitutional right that religious schools may pair with their 
Free Exercise concerns is the Freedom of Expressive Association.299  This right is 
seen as part of the First Amendment’s Free Speech right in that “[t]he right to speak 
is often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice with the voice of 
others.”300  To maintain the clarity of their message, expressive organizations301 have 
                                                 
296 There have been several (unsuccessful) cases where individuals have tried to make Free Exercise 
arguments regarding moral-code issues – one involving a pro-life doctor.  See, e.g., Hyman v. City of 
Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528 (W.D. Kent. 2001).  Generally, courts have found that local civil-
rights codes are generally applicable and do not infringe on any other fundamental right of the 
religious follower. 
 
297 These laws prohibit discrimination by all employers, including religious organizations.  They are 
designed to end a particular form of discrimination, usually based on sexual orientation.   
 
298 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
 
299 The term “Expressive Association” has been used by the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (finding that the Jaycees’ expressive-association rights did 
not permit sex discrimination), Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649-650 (2000), and, 
more recently, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 68-70 (2006) 
(finding that law schools’ expressive-association rights were not violated by a law requiring them to 
allow military recruiters on campus despite the recruiters’ discriminatory hiring practices). 
 
300 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006). 
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a constitutional right to restrict their membership, and especially their workforce, to 
only those who adhere to the group’s beliefs and conduct themselves in a manner 
consistent with the organization’s moral code.  For instance, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, 
the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts’ expressive-association rights permitted 
the group to expel an openly homosexual scout leader despite a New Jersey statute 
banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.302   In so holding, the Court said 
that to prohibit these decisions would force the organization “to accept members it 
does not desire.”303   
 It seems evident that the central purpose of religious organizations and their 
schools is to convey their religious message and teachings.  The Archdiocese of 
Chicago, for instance, says that its “schools exist primarily to evangelize about the 
Good News of Jesus Christ and educate Catholic students for the Church’s 
mission.”304  By requiring employees to conduct their personal lives in line with 
religious doctrine, religious schools communicate to their students the righteousness 
of those beliefs.305  All employees act as role models for a school’s students.  The 
Archdiocese of Chicago, like other Dioceses, views its “Catholic school principals 
and teachers as leaders, giv[ing] witness to Gospel living, spiritual and intellectual 
development, justice for all persons, and a quest for educational excellence.”306  
                                                                                                                                          
301 These organizations do not necessarily have to be specifically religious.  For example, the Boy 
Scouts are not a religious organization but their moral code is based on religion.  But they do need to 
be organizations designed and operated to send a message.   
 
302 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 
303 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
 
304 Archdiocese of Chicago, Mission of Catholic Schools in the Archdiocese of Chicago, available at 
http://schools.archchicago.org/public/genesis.htm. 
 
305 Smith specifically includes “communicative activity” as a “constitutional protection” that, along 
with a Free Exercise claim, would “present . . . a hybrid situation.”  Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 




 Applying local, state, and federal antidiscrimination statutes that focus on 
employee conduct such as homosexuality or sex outside of marriage to religious 
schools would directly infringe on their Freedom of Expressive Association.  If the 
school could not fire employees whose actions conflicted with the church’s moral 
code, the school would be sending an implicit message to students that it endorses 
the activity.  This result could not stand under Boy Scouts v. Dale, and, thus, would 
be unconstitutional when applied to religious schools. 
   
Section IV.B.2.  Free Exercise and the Title VII Exemption 
 
 Imagine that rather than trying to root out conduct-based discrimination, state 
and local officials wished to abrogate the Title VII exemption allowing religious 
organizations to discriminate based on religious affiliation.  Because the Title VII 
exemption is a creature of federal making, such state and local attempts would be 
doomed to fail under the Supremacy Clause.  But what if Congress sought to rescind 
the exemption?  Would applying Title VII’s prohibition against religious 
discrimination against religious schools offend the Constitution? 
 Once again, religious organizations may look to Expressive Association to 
bolster their Free Exercise claims and thereby attempt to force Congress to justify the 
rescission under the heavier burden of strict scrutiny.  But unlike conduct-based 
discrimination, the religious organization’s claims of expressive association will fall 
short since that right is based on speech and conduct rather than religious affiliation 
per se.  As long as the school can require an employee to conform his or her actions 
to the religion’s code of conduct, including requiring silence about his or her true 
religious faith, the school’s religious message remains unadulterated. 307  Whether 
the employee sincerely believes the message is not relevant.  Because the Title VII 
                                                 
307 There may, however, be issues with participation in religious ceremonies by non-adherents.  This 
would transform discrimination based on religious affiliation into discrimination based on conduct.  A 
Catholic who refused to take Communion would face the same reaction from her employers as a non-
Catholic who was religiously proscribed from taking Communion, if the school believed that 
universal participation in the sacrament was an integral part of the Church’s message.  
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exemption is not required for a Church to convey its religious message, revocation of 
the exemption would not trigger expressive association concerns.  Some other 
fundamental right must be found.   
 One alternative right a religious school and its members may choose to 
combine with their Free Exercise claim is the parents fundamental right to “control 
the education and upbringing of one’s children.”308  This right was first recognized in 
a series of cases in the 1920s where state governments attempted to restrict students’ 
educational opportunities.  In Meyer v. Nebraska, the state law attempted to prohibit 
the teaching of any foreign language before high school.309  And, in Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt by Oregon to eliminate all 
parochial schools.310  The Court has repeatedly acknowledged what is now referred 
to as the Meyer-Pierce right311 and has explained that the right includes “the 
inoculation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good 
citizenship.”312   
 Parents instill their children with their own religious beliefs and make choices 
to ensure that their children’s education mirrors those beliefs.313  Persumably, parents 
send their children to religious schools to inculcate the church’s message in their 
children.  Any attempt by Congress to rescind the Title VII exemption and thereby 
explicitly prohibit discrimination based on religious affiliation could lead to dilution 
                                                 
308 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 
309 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 
310 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).   
 
311 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925).  See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 233-34 (1972); Norwood v. Harrison, 
413 U.S. 455, 461 (1973); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).   
 
312 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.  “Pierce stands as a charter of the rights or parents to direct the religious 
upbringing of their children.”  Id.  
 
313 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).  See also Employment Division v. Smith, 494 




of that message.  One could argue that denying schools that participate in a school-
voucher program the Title VII exemption infringes on the fundamental rights of 
parents because religious schools could not ensure the quality and thoroughness of 
the religious education.314  Absent the religious employment-discrimination 
exceptions, schools would not be able to ensure that their employees were devout 
followers of the faith or conduct their lives as role models for students. 
 Smith specifically mentions “parental right[s]” as “constitutional protections” 
that, along with a Free Exercise claim, could “present . . . a hybrid situation.”315   If 
the schools cannot discriminate on the basis of religion, the prohibition would thwart 
the religious activities of parents and denies them their fundamental right to direct 
the education of their children.  The combination of the Free Exercise right and the 
Meyer-Pierce right could present a Smith-Hybrid case. 
 But a parent’s Meyer-Pierce right to control his child’s upbringing is not 
limitless.316  For example, the right does not give parents the authority to dictate 
what is taught in public schools.317  Similarly, Meyer-Pierce does not include the 
right to have one’s children educated in segregated schools.318  It seems likely, 
                                                 
314 There may be standing issues involved here.  The constitutional right to guide one’s children’s 
education belongs to parents and the Free Exercise right belongs to the religious school.  Denying the 
Title VII exemption to religious schools, however, would also burden parents who want access to the 
religious education for their children, and thus, have Free Exercise implications for the parents and 
students.  In Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., v. McCallum, a district court allowed a faith-based 
provider to assert standing on behalf of program participants.  179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 965-66 (2002) 
(finding that where there is a “close relationship” between the Free Exercise claimant and the party 
with the other constitutional claim, “a party that has suffered an injury has standing to raise a claim 
for third parties not before the court) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.4 (3d 
ed.1999); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  Religious 
parents seeking a religious education for their children may have the necessary “close relationship” 
with the religious school it to establish standing in a case challenging the denial of the Title VII 
exemption.      
 
315 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
 
316 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944);  
 
317 See Fields v. Palmdale School District, 447 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005); Blau v. Fort Thomas 
Public School District, 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 
318 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976). 
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therefore, if adjudicated, the Meyer-Pierce right would not give parents the right to 
have their children educated in a school where all the employees were only of one 
religion.  Because the Meyer-Pierce right does not apply, its pairing with the Free 
Exercise Clause would not qualify for the Smith-Hybrid carve-out and any suit 
following the rescission of the Title VII exemption based on this argument would 
likely fail.319     
 
PART V: CONDITIONING PARTICIPATION ON RELINQUISHMENT 
 
 The Establishment Clause analysis shows that religious schools in voucher 
programs can fire or refuse to hire employees based on the ministerial exception, the 
Title VII exemption, or the employee’s conduct.320  And, the Free Exercise Clause 
creates a broad constitutional right to fire ministerial employees and a more limited 
right to fire employees when they act as moral exemplars and their conduct deviates 
from the church’s code of conduct.321  Lastly, the government can institute statutory 
exemptions from employment-discrimination laws and, in some cases, must do so to 
avoid constitutional violations.   
Imagine the state of Massafornia implemented a school-voucher program in 
response to public discontent with the quality of its public-education system.  
Because the large majority of private schools in the state are religious schools, they 
                                                                                                                                          
 
319 The rescission of the Title VII exemption would not be so drastic for religious schools.  Since the 
religious message is protected by conduct-based discrimination and the ministerial exception, there is 
little left for the Title VII exemption to protect.  For example, in Curay-Cramer v. The Ursuline 
Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006), a Catholic teacher was fired after 
adding her name to an advertisement in support of abortion rights.  The school had publicly stated that 
she was fired because of her “serious disagreement with a basic tenet of religious teaching,” id. at 
934, and the court applied the ministerial exception.  Even without the Title VII exemption, the firing 
was not illegal. 
 
320 See supra Parts II and III. 
 




were included as options for students receiving vouchers.  Lawmakers were 
concerned, however, that these religious schools would attempt to discriminate in 
their hiring practices.  To curb this behavior, the school-voucher statute stated that, 
as a condition of participation, “no school may discriminate based on race, sex, 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, or family structure, for any 
position.”   
The Church School agreed to participate in the program and began accepting 
students.  One of the school’s teachers, Meredith Smith, had led the School’s 
worship services but they decided to terminate her employment after Ms. Smith 
wrote an editorial in the local newspaper supporting legislation to allow gay couples 
to adopt children.  In the piece, Ms. Smith identified herself as a lesbian.  The 
Church, when confronting Ms. Smith about the editorial, also discovered that Ms. 
Smith was an atheist.  After her firing, Ms. Smith approached the Massafornia Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission to contest her discharge.  Arguably, the 
Church school could defend the firing on the ministerial exception, the Title VII 
exemption, or conduct-based firings.  Ms. Smith responds that the School waived 
any rights to discriminate that they otherwise would have had by agreeing to 
participate in the school-voucher program.  
 But could the government, whether federal or state, condition participation by 
religious schools in a voucher program on relinquishment or waiver of these 
constitutional rights and statutory employment-discrimination exemptions?  Part V. 
addresses this question first in Section V.A. with respect to the ministerial exception 
and then in Section V.B. in the context of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
   
SECTION V.A: CONDITIONING PARTICIPATION ON WAIVER OF THE MINISTERIAL 
EXCEPTION 
 
There is little need to conduct a thorough “unconstitutional conditions” 
analysis with respect to the ministerial exception.  As this Article has stated 
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elsewhere, the very act of adjudicating an employment dispute between a church and 
its minister would violate the Constitution’s Religion Clauses.  Such a case would be 
akin to a Shelley v. Kraemer-type322 situation where the court’s very involvement in 
the case creates a constitutional violation.323  When faced with a ministerial-
exception case, even if a religious school had arguably waived its constitutional right 
to discriminate when hiring its ministers, the court’s inquiry must end once the 
religious organization establishes that the plaintiff served a ministerial function and 
that the defendant is a religious organization.  “[T]he ministerial relationship lies so 
close to the heart of the church that it would offend the Free Exercise Clause simply 
to require the church to articulate a religious justification for its personnel 
decisions.”324   
Any attempt by government to condition participation in a school voucher 
program on relinquishment of this right would likewise be unconstitutional.325  As a 
result, essentially, the ministerial exception is not subject to waiver or estoppel.  A 
religious organization, such as a school interested in participating in a voucher 
program, could “relinquish” its ministerial-exception rights but such a waiver would 
have no effect.   
 
SECTION V.B: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
 
                                                 
322 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that state enforcement of private, racially-
restrictive covenants would constitute state action and, therefore, violate the Fourteenth Amendment).   
 
323 Some courts have held that the ministerial exception is not a jurisdictional bar to adjudication, but 
instead is a defense that challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim.  See, e.g., Petruska v. 
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 
955 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th 
Cir. 2002).   
 
324 Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
325 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006); Minker v. Baltimore 




 From the case law, it is clear that government may, in some circumstances, 
use its spending power to indirectly achieve ends that it would be constitutionally 
prohibited from pursuing directly.326  For example, in South Dakota v. Dole, the 
Supreme Court upheld a federal highway funding grant conditioned on South Dakota 
adopting a minimum drinking age of twenty-one despite the fact that Congress had 
no constitutional authority to mandate the state’s legal drinking age.327  As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist said, “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated 
legislative fields’ … may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending 
power and the conditional grant of federal funds.”328   
 Congress’s use of its Spending Clause power to achieve otherwise 
unattainable ends is not limitless.  “An unconstitutional condition question is said to 
emerge whenever government conditions a benefit it is not obligated to provide on 
waiver of a constitutional right.”329  While “the Government has no constitutional 
duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally 
protected,”330 not all conditions placed upon constitutional activity in exchange for 
government dollars are constitutional.331   
                                                 
326 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989); 
Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking It Out of Neutral: The Application of Locke’s Substantial Interest Test 
to the School Voucher Debate, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1296 (2005).   
 
327 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).   
 
328 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).   
 
329 Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2001). 
 
330 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991). 
 
331 See Nollan v. Calif. Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 142 (1983) (“a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the 
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a statute that forced the plaintiff  “to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of 
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other”). 
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The test for which conditions are permissible and which are unconstitutional, 
however, remains profoundly unclear.332  “Although it has a long history, the 
‘unconstitutional conditions’ doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously 
inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching principle of constitutional 
law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the rights and powers in 
question.”333  But, according to one of the more recent Court pronouncements on the 
doctrine, “the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right 
… in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the 
benefit sought has little or no relationship” to the condition.334  This standard can be 
broken down into three parts.  The first question asks whether government is 
providing a discretionary or a mandatory benefit.  If the benefit is discretionary, the 
analysis then asks if the condition implicates a constitutional right.  If so, there must 
be a substantial relationship or an “essential nexus” between the benefit sought and 
the waived right in order for the condition to stand.   
 
                                                 
332 Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN.  
L. REV. 151 (2003); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (“The persistent challenge … has been to articulate some 
coherent or at least intelligible principles or tests.”); David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines 
Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the 
Administrative State, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2004) (“One problem is that the governing test 
set forth in South Dakota v. Dole does not provide much in the way of a doctrinal foothold.”); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989); Cass 
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 620 
(1990) ("too crude and too general to provide help in contested cases"); Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking 
It Out of Neutral: The Application of Locke’s Substantial Interest Test to the School Voucher Debate, 
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1301 (2005) (“A review of the unconstitutional conditions cases 
shows that the Court has no firm doctrinal basis for its decisions.”). 
 
333 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n. 12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
 
334 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disagreed with 
the Court’s contention that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine was “well settled.”  Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n. 12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that it is “quite clear that 




Section V.B.1: Discretionary Government Benefit   
 
It is by no means clear that a school’s participation in a voucher program is a 
discretionary government benefit.  Specifically, there are two questions that must be 
answered.  First, does participation in the voucher program amount to a benefit to the 
school?  Second, even if it is a benefit, is it a discretionary one?   
One could argue that children in the program and their parents, not the church 
school, are the true beneficiaries of the government program.  In a typical 
Unconstitutional Conditions case, the recipient of government funds is asked to 
waive his own constitutional rights.  Here, though, the government is trying to 
condition the school’s participation on relinquishment of its right rather than on a 
parent’s.  If no benefit accrues to the school itself, the analysis collapses to whether 
the government can constitutionally demand the waiver while giving nothing in 
return.  In other words, we return to the analysis in Part IV with government 
attempting to curtail a religious school’s constitutional rights to discriminate directly 
rather than indirectly through a condition.335   
Proponents of conditioning would argue that religious schools in voucher 
programs are receiving a benefit, even if they concede that program funds reach the 
schools only through the independent decision making of parents.  Instead of 
receiving government funding in exchange for the waiver of rights, religious schools 
receive a benefit merely by inclusion in the program.  Students who could otherwise 
not afford to attend a religious school can enroll when tuition is subsidized.  
Religious schools benefit through these increased enrollments and the concordant 
increased community presence. 
Even if participation is a sufficient benefit to trigger the Unconstitutional 
Conditions analysis, allowing a religious school to participate may not be a 
                                                 
335 See supra Part IV. 
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discretionary decision.336  Generally, voucher statutes set out objective criteria that 
each school must satisfy before being included in a program.  Such criteria include 
adherence to local education requirements, submitting to financial audits,337 
conducting routine educational assessments of voucher students,338 and monthly 
reporting of voucher students’ enrollment.339  Cleveland’s school voucher program 
commands, for example, that the “state superintendent shall register any school that 
meets” objective criteria such being located in the Cleveland program’s district and 
“state minimum standards for chartered nonpublic schools.”340  The “shall” language 
suggests that the inclusion of a school in the program is not a discretionary decision 
for the state superintendent.   
But other “objective” criteria may require schools to waive their 
antidiscrimination exemptions,341 including those mandated by the Free Exercise 
Clause.  In the Cleveland program, for example, one requirement for inclusion is that 
a religious “school does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic 
                                                 
336 Based on recent case law and commentary, a jurisdiction can authorize and fund a school-voucher 
program but exclude all religious schools.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a 
Washington program that prohibited higher-education tuition vouchers for religious instruction);  
Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944, 952 (Me. 2006) (upholding Maine’s school-voucher 
program that excludes religious schools); Thomas [C.] Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The 
New Constitutional Questions, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (2003) (pre-Locke and Anderson analysis); 
Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Funding of Religious Institutions in Light of Locke v. 
Davey: The Mistakes in Locke v. Davey and the Future of State Payments for Services Provided by 
Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L. REV.  227 (2004).   
 
337 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-1A-705 (1)(b) (2007).    
 
338 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-1A-705 (1)(f) (2007).    
 
339 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.979 (A)(1) (2008) (Cleveland program). 
 
340 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976 (A) (2008). 
 
341 For example, Cleveland’s program does not permit participation by schools that “discriminate on 
the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976 (A) (4) (2008).  
Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-1A-705 (1)(c) (2007) (only requiring compliance with the 
antidiscrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d which prohibits discrimination against those 




background.”342  It is within the superintendent’s discretion to assess whether a 
school has met this criterion.  Because the superintendent could include one religious 
school that uses its antidiscrimination exemptions while excluding another, the 
benefit that schools receive is a discretionary one.    
 
Section V.B.2: Constitutional Rights Implicated 
 
Assuming that a religious school’s participation in a school-voucher program 
is a discretionary government benefit, the next step in an Unconstitutional 
Conditions analysis asks whether a constitutional right is implicated.  If government 
conditions the receipt of a discretionary benefit on the relinquishment of a privilege 
rather than a constitutional right, no constitutional problem exists.343 
Section IV.B.2. demonstrated that the Title VII exemption for religious 
affiliation discrimination does not rise to the level of a constitutional right.  While 
the exemption is permitted by the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause 
does not mandate it.  As such, requiring a religious school to waive their statutory 
right to discriminate based on religious affiliation would not be an unconstitutional 
condition at first glance. 
But in the few cases that have addressed waiver of the Title VII exemption, 
courts have held that it is subject to waiver or estoppels in only a narrow 
circumstance: when federal monies directly and completely funded specific positions 
within a church organization.344  The waiver was valid because the federal 
                                                 
342 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.976 (A) (4) (2008). 
343 An additional issue may exist as to whether the waiver of the right was made knowingly and 
voluntarily.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, 
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences.”).  The antidiscrimination restrictions in the various state statutes authorizing school-
voucher programs may not meet this standard.  See note 341.  Courts may decline to apply these 
conditions rather than to address the potential federalism issue. 
 
344 Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. S88-0353(R), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4797 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 
1989). 
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government conditions the receipt of federal funds on the relinquishment of the 
federal right.  Congress could rescind the Title VII exemption and, because it is not 
constitutionally mandated, achieve the same ends as conditioning participation on 
relinquishment of the exemption.  What they may do directly, they may also 
accomplish indirectly.  The District of Columbia’s Opportunity Scholarship Program 
is a creature of Congress.  Since the same legislative body that granted the Title VII 
exemption is the one now seeking waiver, Congress can condition participation in 
D.C.’s voucher program on relinquishment of the exemption.  No further 
Unconstitutional Conditions analysis is necessary. 
But could a state condition participation in its school-voucher program on 
relinquishment of a federal, but not constitutionally-mandated, right?  Permitting a 
state to interfere with federally granted rights could raise constitutional concerns.345  
Under the Supremacy Clause, the rights granted by the higher sovereign trump the 
state’s efforts.  From the state’s perspective, the federally granted right is the 
equivalent of a constitutional one.  With the exception of the District of Columbia’s 
Opportunity Scholarship Program, state and local monies fund existing school-
voucher programs, not federal dollars.  Therefore, no state or locality would be 
permitted to condition participation in its program on a waiver of the federal Title 
VII exemption unless the condition satisfies the remainder of the Unconstitutional 
Conditions doctrine.   
While from a state’s perspective the Title VII exemption acts like a 
constitutional right, the combination of the Free Exercise Clause and Freedom of 
Expressive Association, in the context of conduct-based firings, is a full-fledged 
                                                 
345 Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hospital Medical Center, No. 03-CV-6233 (JBW), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12816, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004); Collette v. St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital, 132 F. Supp. 
2d 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“an effort by New York to condition a state law right on the waiver of 
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constitutional right that acts to constrain both state and federal governments alike.346  
As a constitutional right is implicated in the hypothetical waiver demanded by the 
state in exchange for inclusion in the program, the Unconstitutional Conditions 
analysis must continue to the next step: Essential Nexus.   
 
Section V.B.3: Essential Nexus 
 
The final step in an Unconstitutional Conditions analysis requires that the 
asserted condition and the implicated constitutional right share an essential nexus. 347  
But if the person asked to agree to the condition is fully apprised of what he is 
relinquishing and the exchange is beneficial to both him and the state, the would-be 
conditionee should be free to waive his rights regardless of the germaneness of the 
condition.  He has implicitly found that the relinquished right is not worth as much to 
him as the newly gained benefit.   
On the other hand, there is a lingering concern that 
Leviathan, swollen with tax dollars, will buy up people’s liberty.  
Moved not by redistributive frenzy but by the desire to expand the 
sphere of state power by exerting moral and social control that it 
could not constitutionally impose directly, the state will buy people 
out to control their decision making.348 
 
Implicitly, two fears stem from unfettered opportunities to bargain away individual 
rights: first, that individuals will waive their rights for too low a price, and second, 
that broad application of a constitutional right confers societal benefits that 
individuals will not take into account.  By requiring an essential nexus between the 
                                                 
346 See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 
347 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (explaining the essential 
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program’s purpose and the implicated constitutional right, we tame Leviathan where 
no such connection exists but still allow informed individuals to waive their rights 
when it does.  In other words, if a “condition … utterly fails to further the end 
advanced as the justification” for the program, it is unconstitutional. 349 
As seen in the previous Section, two scenarios present situations where 
conditioning participation in a school-voucher program on a religious school’s 
waiver of its statutory and constitutional rights to discriminate requires an essential 
nexus: the waiver of the Title VII exemption in a state-run program and the 
relinquishment of the constitutional right to discriminate against certain employees 
based on their conduct.  To determine if this “essential nexus” exists, we must 
compare the purpose of the school-voucher program with the rights to be waived.   
While eliminating, correcting, or punishing the societal ills created by 
employment discrimination is a legitimate state purpose, it is not related to the 
school-voucher program whose obvious purpose is to provide increased educational 
opportunities for children.  Requiring religious schools to forgo their Title VII 
exemption or their constitutional right to discriminate against employees based on 
conduct does nothing to advance the program’s objectives.  In fact, it may hinder 
them if attempted enforcement or threats of enforcement dissuade religious schools 
from participating in the programs in the first place.  In contrast, conditions in 
voucher statutes that prohibit discrimination against students would likely exhibit the 
essential nexus to the voucher program since restricting access to educational 
opportunities would impede the voucher program’s goals.  But because no “essential 
nexus” exists between state-demanded conditions on certain types of otherwise 
permissible employment discrimination and their voucher programs, those conditions 
are unconstitutional and unenforceable.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
 






 This Article considered whether the employment practices of religious 
schools participating in a voucher program raises both Establishment Clause and 
Free Exercise Clause issues.  To assess an Establishment Clause challenge to 
accommodations such as exemptions from federal, state, and local antidiscrimination 
laws, the haphazardly applied Lemon test is ill-fitting and unworkable.  This Article 
suggested a new, more coherent test that the Supreme Court should adopt.  First, the 
success of a religious school in teaching its religious tenets requires government non-
interference in activities fundamental to the religious mission.  In other words, “let 
religion be religious.”  Second, allowing all religious schools to participate in 
voucher programs and use the employment antidiscrimination exceptions 
demonstrates the government’s neutrality among religions and ensures that 
government is not using its powers to favor one religion over another.  Third, any 
federal or state money that reaches religious schools that practice employment 
discrimination arrives there “only as a result of the private decision of individual 
parents.”350  The government is not forcing children to attend the discriminating 
schools, and, as a result, no reasonable observer could view the antidiscrimination 
law exceptions as government endorsement of the religious organization’s actions 
specifically or religion in general.  Lastly, without exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws, government could become excessively entangled with 
religious organizations in order to ferret out unlawful employment actions.  
 While the Establishment Clause merely permits exceptions from 
antidiscrimination laws for religious schools in voucher programs, the Free Exercise 
Clause prohibits state enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes where exceptions 
are absent.  The ministerial exception allows all kinds of employment discrimination 
for certain key jobs because the Free Exercise Clause requires governmental respect 
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for a religious organization’s internal structure.  Any investigation into a church’s 
employment decision making would itself create a constitutional violation.  With 
respect to non-ministerial positions, though, government can and should take a closer 
look.  Employment discrimination justified by concerns about the integrity of the 
religious message should be permitted because of the associational freedom enjoyed 
by all expressive associations, including religious schools.  This argument, however, 
falters when examining the Title VII exemption for discrimination based on religion.  
There is no Free Exercise rationale justifying elevating the Title VII exemption to a 
constitutionally-mandated right.  If a religious organization’s non-ministerial 
employees conduct themselves in accord with the religious message, the 
organization’s ability to convey its message has not been damaged.  Religious 
affiliation is not a badge that either reinforces or detracts from that message and, as 
such, does not inform either the church’s associational rights or a parent’s right to 
direct his child’s education.   
 While the Free Exercise Clause would prohibit states from enforcing 
antidiscrimination laws against some employees in particular circumstances, states 
may attempt to instead condition participation in a school-voucher program on 
voluntary waiver of religious schools’ rights to discriminate.  While state 
governments have expanded powers to restrict activities using conditions in areas 
where they would be prohibited from legislating outright, there are limits based on 
the Supreme Court’s Unconstitutional Conditions doctrine.  The analysis, however, 
demonstrates that any conditions relinquishing a religious school’s right to 
discriminate in hiring ministerial employees, their right to enforce their federal-
granted right to discriminate with respect to all employees based on religious 
affiliation in a state voucher program, and their constitutional right to discriminate 
based on conduct for some employees, would fail this test and would be 
unconstitutional.  While states are, of course, free to put such conditions into a 
voucher programs statutory language, as several have, these conditions are 
essentially empty unenforceable promises.   
